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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the study has been to assess the question of sustainability of economic growth 
and human development, particularly using sub-Saharan Africa in context. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
an interesting case study because, on the one hand, it has been mired in poverty and remains the 
least developed region in the world, and on the other, it has experienced a revival in economic 
growth since the mid-1990s. 
Economists tend to use the term economic development and economic growth interchangeably. 
However, questions have been raised about whether Africa’s latest growth episode is indeed 
‘development’. Although there are many issues at stake, the key question, and the focus of this 
thesis, is whether sub-Saharan Africa’s revival is sustainable. 
The paper sets out the debate between the ‘World Bank view’ and the ‘alternative view’. The 
main debate lies around how genuine development should be achieved. Firstly, the ‘World Bank 
view’ claims that economic growth is necessary and sufficient condition to achieve development. 
Economic growth will be generated by ‘orthodox’ policies and this growth will automatically 
trickle-down and stimulate development. Secondly, the ‘alternative view’ argues that economic 
growth is necessary but it is not sufficient to stimulate sustainable development. Economic 
growth without ‘qualitative’ change is not ‘sustainable’. Indeed, human development shortfalls 
(as well as other, social, political and structural problems), if not addressed through appropriate 
policy interventions, can undermine economic growth. The ‘alternative view’ appears to be 
strongly supported by evidence from other developing regions such as Latin America and East 
Asia. 
The empirical study conducted in this thesis reinforces doubts about ‘sustainability’. Even 
though there are signs of convergence in some indicators; this is not the case for all indicators. 
More importantly the gap between sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions remains 
very wide. Sub-Saharan Africa’s development path remains uncertain. The intention in this study 
is not to be conclusive that sub-Saharan Africa cannot achieve sustainable development. Rather 
the study attempts to identify potential hindrances to sub-Saharan Africa’s development and to 
provide a solid foundation for further research in the same direction. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1    Background 
Figure 1.1: GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa (constant 2000 US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2012 [NY.GDP.PCAP.KD] (World Development Indicators). 
As shown in Figure 1.1 sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP per capita has recorded positive growth in the 
1960s and mid-1970s. However, in the 1980s sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP per capita dramatically 
declined. From the mid-1990s, growth started to recover. From the 2000s, sub-Saharan Africa 
has experienced significant growth acceleration. This reveals that sub-Saharan Africa over the 
past 50 years has been characterised by an episodic growth path. The important question which 
comes to mind is whether sub-Saharan Africa’s recent growth path constitutes ‘development’ 
and is ‘sustainable’. The main issue here is that economists often tend to use the terms economic 
development and economic growth interchangeably. However, since the 1970s, development 
economics have moved from a single-minded focus on distribution, capital accumulation, 
incomes, and economic growth toward a more complex understanding of development as broad-
based wellbeing improvement (Chakraborty, 1997: 3).    
In particular, a debate has emerged regarding globalisation. On the one hand is what Kiely (2004) 
calls the ‘World Bank view’. The World Bank view claims that economic growth and globalisation 
is the only means to fight against and reduce poverty and inequality. In this view, economic 
integration and liberalisation will encourage competitiveness and efficiency, which will produce 
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economic growth. Through this channel, the income of poor people and the quality of life of 
poor people will be improved (Kiely, 2004: 7-8).  
On the other hand there is the ‘alternative view’ which claims that globalisation has contributed 
to the amplification of poverty and inequality (Bhagwati, 2004: 4). The point here is that 
‘development’ is regarded as not just the result of economic growth, that is, ‘quantitative’. 
Economic growth itself does not necessarily reduce poverty. Sen (1999, in Szirmai, 2005: 7) 
argues that “a country can have a rapid growth, but still do badly in terms of literacy, health, life 
expectancy and nutrition”. Most proponents of the ‘alternative view’ do not dispute that 
economic growth is necessary. But they argue that economic growth is not sufficient. 
Development involves more than just growth (Szirmai, 2005: 7). Instead, they have emphasised 
‘balanced growth’. Growth without ‘qualitative’ change is not sustainable and human 
development is a necessary component of ‘sustainable development’. 
The debate about pro-poor growth is a case in point. There is increasing emphasis on ‘social 
policy’ and ‘poverty reduction’ (through such instruments as social grants) in orthodox 
development economics (Bezemer & Heady, 2008: 1352). This is evident in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and “the enthusiastic financial and intellectual support” of agencies 
like the World Bank for the upsurge in social grants in many developing countries (Teichman, 
2008: 448). The objection to this shift in focus is that anti-poverty policy is ‘residualist’, that is, it 
treats symptoms rather than structural causes, and continues to assume that the primary solution 
to development is ‘orthodox’ pro-growth policy (see also Ellis et al., 2009).  
There remains considerable distance between the two views. On the one hand, authors like 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) assert that the best way to fight poverty is to target growth. On the 
other hand, authors like Ranis et al. (1997) assert just as strongly that growth without human 
development is not sustainable.   
This has remained a debate for empirical and conceptual reasons. Firstly there are many 
concerns regarding the quality of data. Kiely (2004: 5) criticises the World Bank for making 
periodic adjustments from the base year on economic growth data. With specific reference to the 
debate at hand, there are major issues regarding the measurement of GDP per capita and the 
measurement of globalisation. Pogge and Reddy (2003, cited in Harrison, 2007: 46) argue that 
the updating or the adjustments of the PPP base year will cause overestimation of the incomes 
of poor people to get progressively worse as average incomes rise (Harrison, 2007: 46).  
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The tendency to measure globalisation or openness by the trade/GDP ratio is questionable. It is 
possible to have a high ratio of exports to GDP but still have different degrees of import 
restrictions. Generally, poor countries depend on the export of a few primary commodities and 
have very low and sometimes negative rates growth (Kiely, 2004: 8-9). Kiely (2004) points to the 
failure to specify exactly which types of goods are being traded and to ignore the impact of 
liberalised trade on countries at different stages of development, based on different structures of 
production (UNCTAD, 2002a: 102 cited in Kiely, 2004: 9). Thus, both of these can completely 
change the interpretation of the data and give different results. These empirical issues are 
sufficiently significant to constitute a critique to the ‘World Bank View’. 
Secondly there are concerns related to conceptual issues. Much literature has been preoccupied 
with the question of what constitutes ‘development’. Evidently this is a multidimensional issue 
that incorporates much more than gross domestic product per capita (Bérenger & Chouchane, 
2007: 1259). Issues regarding the distribution of income, subjective and objective wellbeing, and 
environmental quality are discussed briefly in chapter 2 (Gough & McGregor, 2007: 59-60). 
Although alternatives like the Human Development Index are increasingly used in comparative 
studies, it seems very hard to come up with a broader measure which should be considered as a 
valid estimate of wellbeing (Ross, 2004).  
1.2   Aim of the research 
Although the empirical and the conceptual issues discussed in the last two paragraphs are 
explored in this thesis, the thesis focuses on a more tractable and arguably more pertinent 
question. This is the issue of the ‘sustainability’ of economic growth itself. As discussed, there is 
a tendency to assume that sub-Saharan Africa’s growth acceleration since the late 1990s 
constitutes development. However, sub-Saharan Africa still lags far behind in other indicators of 
human, social, political and economic development. In particular, the study intends to investigate 
the hypothesis of Ranis et al. (1997) that only countries that have promoted human development 
achieved sustained growth paths. The hypotheses of the research are:  
1) That economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustainable 
economic development; 
2) That sub-Saharan Africa remains far behind not only in terms of human development 
but also in terms of economic structure; 
3) That the lack of human and social development raises concerns about the sustainability 
of sub-Saharan Africa’s recent growth.  
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1.3   Thesis plan 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One is the introduction. Chapter Two presents 
the theoretical framework by reviewing the conceptual issues under study. Chapter Three 
describes and investigates sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development trajectory, focusing on 
the political and socio-economic post-colonial legacy in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter Four is an 
empirical assessment of the hypotheses. And finally, Chapter Five concludes the study by 
summarising and suggesting further research. 
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 CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theoretical issues regarding the question of sustainability of economic 
growth and human development, focusing on the role of human development. The chapter aims 
to give more understanding and to clarify the relationship between economic growth and 
development. The two concepts are often used interchangeably. However, it is possible to 
experience long period of economic growth without necessarily having development. Countries 
can experience similar growth rates and similar levels of GDP per capita yet may be very 
different in terms of other indicators of development. Figure 2.1 give such an example, China 
and Angola had similar GDP per capita in 1993 and grew at similar rates between 1993 and 
2006. However, social indicators (one of which, the fertility rate is shown in the figure) illustrate 
that Angola is much less developed than China.  
Figure 2.1 Fertility rate and GDP per capita in China and Angola 
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In fact there is no simple answer to the question ‘what is development?’ Section 2.2 defines the 
concepts related to economic development and economic growth. Section 2.3 discusses the 
issues around growth theory and modernisation, describing the Lewis model and the notion of 
trickle-down as a procedure to achieve a genuine development. Section 2.4 elaborates on the 
‘alternative view’ and the question of sustainable development. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
2.2 Definition of the concepts: Economic growth and economic 
development 
In comparing the level of development between countries, there are some important questions 
which come in mind. These include: what development is, what development is supposed to 
achieve, and how development is to be measured. To improve the quality of life for the whole 
population or to ensure people’s freedom and security is a more delicate objective than 
increasing the national output (Soubbotina, 2004: 7). As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is very 
important to define what economic growth is and what development is.  
On the one hand, economic growth is ‘quantitative’: that is growth in the absolute amount of 
goods and services produced. This is obviously associated with increased consumption and 
hence material wellbeing (Wald, 1994: 317). To some extent, economic growth is considered as 
an indicator of development. However, there is broad recognition that there is more to 
development than growth. For instance, Stiglitz argues that “society ought to adjust its policies 
so as to target goals other than just economic growth...like reductionsincome inequality or 
carbon emissions” (Economist, 2009). On the other hand, therefore, development is defined as a 
broad issue which includes improving the quality of life (wellbeing or human development) in a 
sustainable way. Therefore, this is where the concept of wellbeing comes in. The concept of 
wellbeing includes two major branches, namely ‘objective wellbeing’ and ‘subjective wellbeing’.  
Objective wellbeing includes social indicators based on objective, quantitative statistics (such as 
health, infant mortality, longevity, education, levels of crimes and so on). Subjective wellbeing is 
about the individuals’ subjective experience of their lives, under the assumption that wellbeing 
can be defined in terms of hedonic feelings or cognitive satisfaction (Denier & Eunkook, 1997: 
189-191; Gough & McGregor, 2007: 59-60). 
However, the wellbeing concept is very hard to quantify. This problem has two components. 
The first concerns the measurement of individual indicators (i.e. ‘happiness’). This is a particular 
difficulty with ‘subjective wellbeing’, but ‘data problems’ (such as missing data, problems with 
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data consistency across years and countries, etc.) also plague more ‘concrete’ statistics. Secondly, 
human development is a multidimensional phenomenon (Bérenger and Chouchane, 2007: 1259). 
This raises the problem of how to pick which individual indicators to use and how to aggregate 
them (Ross, 2004). There are several indices that attempt to aggregate the concept of wellbeing. 
The best known of these is the Human Development Index (HDI) which includes measures of 
life expectancy, literacy and education as well as income and has been used since 1990 by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2005 cited in McGillivray, 2006: 2). But 
there are other alternatives such as Human Poverty Index (HPI), the Inequality-adjusted Human 
Development Index (IHDI), and theMultidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and so on (see 
UNDP, 2013 and Kenny, 2005: 200).  
A final problem is that, these indices can be used to capture ‘wellbeing’ but cannot explain other 
‘qualitative’ dimensions such as ‘modernisation’ or ‘development’ and in particular whether any 
improvement or increase in wellbeing (or human development) is sustainable. It is this problem 
assessing whether any ‘development’ episode is sustainable that is the main focus of this thesis. 
The rest of this chapter considers two broad perspectives of sustainable development and how it 
is achieved, namely, the ‘World Bank view’ and the ‘alternative view’.   
2.3   Growth theory and modernisation: The ‘World Bank view’ 
As discussed in the previous section, “economic growth” is not the same thing as 
“development.” This is not disputed. However, the ‘World Bank view’ implies that the 
distinction does not matter, because it argues that growth is sufficient to generate genuine 
development. Thus, the ‘World Bank view’ argues that there is no need for special policies or 
government intervention to ensure that growth is creating development. This sub-section 
elaborates on the views concerning the growth theories and highlighting whether growth itself is 
sufficient to generate genuine development.  
The first issue is ‘why economic growth is good for the poor’. As mentioned by Kiely (2004), the 
‘World Bank view’ believes that globalisation (openness) and economic integration through 
financial and trade liberalisation will encourage competitiveness and efficiency, which will 
produce economic growth, that will ‘trickle-down’ to the poor (Kiely, 2004: 7-8). Dollar & Kraay 
(2002: 196-199) argued that the average incomes of poor people varies proportionally with the 
average per capita income, and that any growth-enhancing policies and institutions which raise 
the average incomes of poor people can be successful for poverty reduction. In short, economic 
growth is good for poor people and can benefit anyone else in the community proportionally 
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(Dollar & Kraay, 2002: 196-199). That is why Dollar & Kraay call for ‘pro-poor’ growth policies 
capable of increasing the share of income of poor people in society. (Dollar & Kraay, 2002: 196-
199). 
As mentioned previously, the ‘trickle-down’ effect means that, economic growth is going to 
trickle-down causing structural changes by creating new opportunities such as new investment, 
creation of jobs, increase the income of poor people and reduce poverty. This expectation is 
derived from the standard neoclassical growth theory which predicts the ‘convergence property’ 
centred on the idea that ‘laissez-faire’ generates economic growth in poor countries. 
The neoclassical growth model uses a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
Y= A (t) K1-βLβ 
In the expression, Y symbolises the net national product, K symbolises the stock of capital, L 
symbolises the stock of labour, and A symbolises the level of technology. Technology in the 
neoclassical model is improved from outside of the model (Romer, 1994: 4). The convergence 
property is drawn from the neoclassical growth property of diminishing returns to capital. This 
means that with a low starting level of real GDP per capita, a country is expected to have higher 
economic growth (Barro, 1996: 4; Arjona et al., 2003: s121). The only impediment to 
convergence in this view is the state implementing ‘bad’ polices that ‘interfere’ with market 
processes. This argument (i.e. blaming the state) is prevalent in explanations of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s post-colonial performance. This is discussed further below and more extensively in 
Chapter 3. The convergence property means that countries will conditionally converge to the 
same levels of income, if they have the same economic characteristics (labour force growth, 
saving rates, and so on) (Todaro & Smith, 2011: 146). The low savings rates that continue to 
characterise sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 4) are not necessarily an impediment to growth in 
this conception, because developing countries can access global savings by embracing foreign 
investment and ‘financial globalisation’ (Fisher, 2003: 14; Mishkin, 2006, cited in Rodrik & 
Subramanian, 2008).  
The second issue is whether growth causes development. Neoclassical development theory also 
claims there will be a qualitative effect: i.e. that growth will lead to economic development. The 
argument is that the economy will go through the Lewisian turning point whereby 
underdeveloped countries move from being dominated by a traditional subsistence sector to a 
more urbanised and industrialised economy (modern sector) (Todaro & Smith, 2011: 115). This 
suggests that in the early stage of economic development there is significant surplus labour 
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supply in the traditional or subsistence agriculture sector which is available for employment in 
the expansion of the industrial or modern sector. It is assumed that the marginal productivity of 
this unskilled labour force supply is below the subsistence wage which in turn constitutes a wage 
base in the modern sector (Golley & Meng, 2011: 556). Economic growth in the modern sector 
draws labour from the traditional sector, with a rapid expansion of labour demand at constant 
wages. This continues until the surplus of labour is used up, after which shortages of labour 
would mean that wages then start to rise in both sectors, and inequalities between the two 
sectors begin to decline. The Lewisian turning point leads to structural transformation with a 
more capital and technology-intensive growth process (Hofmeyr, 1994: 63-65, see also Knight, 
2007: 3-4 and Golley & Meng, 2011: 556). This leads to ‘modernisation’ with both rural and 
urban areas forced to improve productivity in order to afford more expensive labour (Hofmeyr, 
1994: 63-65). This describes how some developed countries and recently industrialised countries 
(such as South Korea and Taiwan) achieved industrialisation (Knight, 2007: 3). 
Considering that people are moving from traditional occupations in the rural areas into non-
traditional occupations in the urban areas, this also stimulates a social demographic transition 
particularly for women. Women are expected to be more educated in urban areas than in rural 
areas. For instance, women with a higher level of education tend to make greater use of birth 
control (Bongaarts, 2010: 3). Thus, there is a significant decline of the fertility rate, while there is 
an increase of the surviving number of children. In other words, the Lewisian turning point is 
also associated with a demographic transition (see Ryder 1986; Bongaarts, 2010: 3). 
Furthermore, many studies have identified a positive relationship between development 
(modernisation) and democracy. Structural change (such as urbanisation, factory production, 
improvements of communication and transportation) gives the working classes and urban 
middle classes and small farmers the opportunity to organise themselves and put pressure on the 
dominant groups (upper classes, landlords and bourgeoisie) in terms of economic and cultural 
power. Hence, this will lead to democracy and political maturation (Huber et al., 1993: 74-75). 
The idea is that development induces democratisation and the upsurge of the middle classes and 
working classes in the urban area is going to counterbalance the dominant groups. The level of 
democracy is related to the level of development (Huber et al., 1993: 76). Huber et al. (1993: 83-
84) argued that “capitalist development transforms the class structure... thus making it more 
difficult for elites to exclude them politically. Simultaneously, development weakens the landed 
upper class, democracy’s most consistent opponent”. 
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In essence, the ‘World Bank view’ is that growth (caused by the ‘basic package’) is sufficient to 
generate development. So, for example, growth leads to the Lewisian and demographic 
transitions. Society is transformed from agrarian dominated to urban middle class dominated. 
The urban middle class is educated and has a strong work, savings and democratic ethic. Briefly, 
the economy is ‘modernised’ and its subsequent growth path sustained.  
Collier (2006: 189-190) accepts the ‘World Bank view’ that African countries would flourish and 
modernise if they followed the ‘World Bank view’ policy package. But Collier (2006: 189-190) 
argues that this tends not tohappen because politics interferes in the process. This echoes the 
point made above about why convergence might not occur. The argument is that African 
countries made ‘bad choices’ (i.e. excessive economic regulation, attempts to redistribute 
resources to favoured groups, conflict and boom-bust cycles etc.). Collier (2006) acknowledges 
that it is difficult for such countries to break out of patterns determined by ‘bad choices’. That is 
why Collier (2006) argues that, African governments need the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) and WTO (World Trade Organisation), which force them to embrace globalisation and 
weaken the grip of local elites. The assumption here is that if Africa follows the ‘basic package’ 
of the ‘World Bank view’, then growth and development would follow. The only problem is that 
the political interference and structural problems of African countries prevent them to follow the 
‘basic package’.  
The extreme market fundamentalism (free-markets, private property and individual incentives, 
and a restricted role for government) of the “Washington Consensus” has softened to the “Post-
Washington Consensus” (Gore, 2000: 790-794). Nevertheless, this is just a minor change from 
market fundamentalism, but with a particular attention on the social aspects and the role played 
by government intervention in case of market failure (Gore, 2000: 792-794). It appears that the 
Washington Consensus has shifted away from market fundamentalism, but in fact the free-
market and liberalisation (privatisation) remain the pillars of neoliberalism. 
2.4   The ‘alternative view’ 
As discussed in Section 2.3, the Bretton woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) have 
advocated liberalisation and free-market policy to developing countries as the main channel to 
stimulate economic growth and development and to fight poverty. Contrary to this, the 
‘alternative view’ argues that liberalisation and laissez-faire have been more harmful than 
curative. Section 2.4.1 considers evidence (focussing on South Korea and Latin America) that 
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appears to contradict the ‘World Bank view’. Section 2.4.2 explains the logic of the ‘alternative 
view’, and in particular, why growth might not be sufficient for sustainable development. 
2.4.1 Did other developing countries follow the orthodox path? 
 Before the crisis of 1997, Korea was known as a protectionist economy. Korea did not open 
itself to foreign industrial and financial investors who wanted to invest in the Korean economy, 
which was providing a lot of profit opportunities (Crotty & Lee, 2009: 150). Western economists 
(IMF and World Bank) praised the East Asia economic model; by which Korea sustained long 
term development (Crotty & Lee, 2009: 150). But in the decade preceding the crisis, the 
government stopped implementing industrial policy and removed regulation and coordination 
concerning the Chaebol conglomerates investment decisions. Domestic financial markets were 
substantially liberalised (the creation of new non-bank financial intermediaries that were not 
under government regulation). Finally, government reduced restrictions on short-term capital 
inflows. In addition there was a big pressure coming from the external neoliberal forces (Crotty 
and Lee, 2009: 153). 
Therefore, industrial policy was stopped and government regulation removed, and the Chaebol 
conglomerates could freely invest in the financial foreign market. The reforms undertaken by the 
Korean government to liberalise brought the huge problem of debts to foreign banks, which 
increased between 1994 and 1996, and peaked at $120 billion by late 1997. These debts were 
used to finance Chaebol investment spending (Crotty & Lee, 2009: 153). In other words, 
liberalisation was leading Korea toward an inevitable financial crisis. After the crisis, under the 
neoliberal economic regime imposed by the IMF on the Korean economy, economic 
performance was not good. For example, GDP growth declined from 8.0% to 4.3% and real 
consumption growth declined from 7.7% to 3.0% between 1998 and 2006, compared to the 
earlier period, 1987 to 1997(Crotty & Lee, 2009: 154). Crotty & Lee (2009: 151) argued that 
“…the major cause of the crisis was not inefficiencies in the structure of the Korean 
development model, but rather contingent inefficiencies created by liberalisation … This 
liberalisation process weakened the structural integrity and coherence of the traditional Korean 
economic system.” Crotty and Lee (2009: 149-154) claim that the IMF imposed on Korea to 
adopt radical structural reforms and the neoliberal model because it was good for their own 
interests. The IMF was not trying to help Korea to solve their problem of liquidity during the 
financial crisis in 1997. The Korean development model was functioning correctly without 
adopting the orthodox policies (neoliberal model). Martin Feldstein, chairman of the Council of 
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Economic Advisors under President Reagan, said that, Korea needed just to restructure its 
foreign bank loans; so; that Korea could have the time to accumulate necessary reserves to 
services its debts (Crotty & Lee, 2009: 154). 
For the Latin America case, Wood (2009: 139) contests Reid’s assessment about the positive 
effects of the Washington Consensus, based on the three main elements: macroeconomic 
stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation. These policies were implemented to fight against 
inflation, to remove protectionist barriers and allow trade and investment and good 
redistribution or allocation of goods and services through markets (Wood, 2009: 139). Reid 
(2007 cited in Wood, 2009: 136) has recognised that at the end of 1990, Latin America was the 
most open continent in the world and implementing all the policies imposed from the 
Washington Consensus. Reid (2007cited in Wood, 2009: 136) argued that Washington consensus 
policies achieved success in Latin America (particularly in Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil) 
(Wood, 2009: 136). 
The Washington Consensus did well in the privatisation of public services by promoting greater 
efficiency in productivity and improving infrastructure (Wood, 2009: 139). But the benefits of 
that privatisation have been insignificant or almost invisible. Reid (2007) admitted that overall 
the Latin American economic performance was disappointing. Growth rose in the early 1990s 
and stagnated between 1998 and 2002. The reason for the bad economic performance was 
because many reforms needed to be made (technology needed to be updated or modernised, a 
need to improve transport, to reinforce and strength institutions and so on). Latin America was 
following the neoliberal programmes but with a new upsurge of a new consensus which 
emphasised equity and the role of government to achieve it (Wood, 2009: 140). For example, 
Chile has achieved the most significant growth in Latin America. Brazil and Mexico have 
pursued anti-poverty programmes, focused on the social aspects. The rate of poverty declined 
and income distribution became less unequal in Brazil. Reid (2007) argued that the neoliberal 
model freed up resources for social spending which were held by the state-owned companies in 
Latin America (e.g. Brazil and Mexico) (Wood, 2009: 140).  
Wood (2009: 142) disagreed with the all assessments made by Reid (2007) concerning the 
positive impact of the Washington Consensus in Latin America. For example, employment and 
real wages were severely affected by the effects of the neoliberal restrictions (Latin America’s 
unemployment rate picked up from 5.8% to 10.4% between 1990 and 2000) (Wood, 2009: 142). 
Wood (2009: 142-143) did not accept the fact that the inequality was reduced between rich and 
poor people in Latin America. Wood (2009: 142-143) did not deny that the number of poor 
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income people measured by income probably dropped. However, the living standards of the 
poorest did not have an impact on the social level of poor people. In Chile, the stated-subsidised 
pension system represents 5% of the GDP contribution, which is insufficient to deal with the 
levels of social disparities (Wood, 2009: 142-143). 
The Washington Consensus has not only brought some changes in terms of opportunity and 
wealth distribution on the economic structure in the different countries in Latin America. These 
processes have been accomplished through de-industrialisation and tertiarisation with a great 
emphasis on export-growth which has compressed levels of domestic consumption, even though 
urbanisation has overflowed the cities with unsatisfied needs (Wood, 2009: 147). Latin America 
has inherited neoliberal legacies which have caused much damage to the economy. For example, 
Mexico was struck by the financial crisis in 2008 with a decrease of capital inflows and a high 
rate of unemployment (Wood, 2009: 147). In short, Latin America has been left with huge socio-
economic dislocations from the orthodox policies (neoliberal model), which have weakened any 
potentiality of self-development. The sad reality is that the rich are still getting better off, while 
the poor remain in precarious living conditions and Latin America remains very vulnerable to 
outside shocks (Wood, 2009: 147). 
In summary, Korea and Latin America did follow the neoliberal model and structural adjustment 
programmes. A case can be made that, not only has the neoliberal doctrine failed to promote 
sustainable development, it has in one way or another disrupted the good functioning of their 
economies. However, the ‘alternative view’ argued that the bottom line that is the laissez-faire or 
the invisible hand did not work in the way to promote the general welfare but rather to keep and 
maintain those who are already well-off, and failed to give many opportunities toward a high 
level for the vast majority of people (Todaro & Smith, 2011: 130). As Crotty & Lee (2009: 167) 
argue, developing countries should not accept any liberalisation policies, which can harm and 
weaken the economy. The liberalisation policies affect and destroy the capacity of nations to 
achieve their own economic goals. 
2.4.2 Sustainable development: the theoretical basis of the ‘alternative view’ 
So far, this chapter has set out the ‘World Bank view’ and considered some evidence that appears 
to be at odds with it. This section will elaborate on the alternative view which argues that 
development goes beyond economic growth and calls for particular attention to human 
development as an important element for sustainable economic development. 
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Often ‘development’ is associated with the term ‘sustainable’. Concerning the notion of 
‘sustainability’, diverse definitions have been proposed. One of the most widely accepted and 
known is defined by the Brundtland Report that development is sustainable if it “meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (The World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, cited in Munier, 
2003: 10). The main concepts in the Brundtland Report are: development, present, and future. 
Let us examine the different concepts as explained by the Brundtland Report (Munier, 2005: 10-
11): 
 Development means economic growth, social progress and environmental protection;  
 The present refers to the need to act in the present with a view to achieving growth that 
comprises not just economic progress but also environment and social advancement; 
 The future refers to the long-term future inhabited by our descendants, that is, the 
children of our children’s children, not to the immediate future. 
Sustainable development has been broadly defined as “the kind of human activity that nourishes 
and perpetuates the historical fulfilment of the whole community of life on earth” (Bossel, 1999: 
2). Whereas ‘sustainability’ is often associated with the natural environment, it should also clear 
that economic, human development and political aspects are included. 
Indeed, Bossel (1999) argues that sustainable development of human society embraces all aspects 
such as environmental, material, ecological, economic, legal, cultural, political, social and 
psychological. These aspects require more much attention to constitute an acceptable form of 
sustainable development (Bossel, 1999: 2-3). For example, a democratic society may be more 
securely sustainable than a brutal dictatorship. To some extent, human development is self-
sustaining. Often, when people reach a certain levels of human development, they attempt to 
maintain and sustain that level such as good health and education for the coming generation 
(Ranis & Stewart, 2000: 55). 
Although it is not the main focus of this study, environmental conditions are an important aspect 
in improving the quality of life and the maintenance of ecosystems. This is particularly so in sub-
Saharan Africa, where ‘growth’ remains largely dependent on the exploitation of natural 
resources (Arbache & Page, 2009). Economic development and environment management are 
often assumed to be at odds with each other. The idea is that rapid growth only comes with 
environmental degradation, and an improved environment can come only at the cost of reduced 
growth and development.  
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In some situations, rapid economic growth is creating pollution that reduces welfare and incurs 
clean-up costs in the future. If rapid economic growth is possible only through depleting 
resources (such as clear-cutting forests to support the timber industry), growth may not be 
sustainable and may come at very high cost (Perkins, Radelet & Lindauer, 2006: 758). For 
example, prudent management of fisheries can help provide a sustainable source of food for 
fishers and their families or support larger-scale commercial fishing (Perkins et al., 2006: 757). 
Development and environmental goals are complementary, and reducing environmental 
degradation can help lower production costs and directly improve economic output and welfare 
(Perkins et al., 2006: 758). 
As mentioned in the previous section, economists have broadly defined the notion of 
sustainability in economic terms. Economists define sustainable economic development as an 
improvement in wellbeing today which will not reduce or decrease the improvement of 
wellbeing tomorrow (Barbier, 2005: 14). In other words, sustainable economic development 
must guarantee that future generations should also experience at least the same levels of 
economic welfare as the present generation. Economists have clearly expressed that sustainable 
economic development as a sustained increase in per capita welfare over time (Pezzey, 1989 cited 
in Barbier, 2005: 14). Furthermore, “sustainable economic development is… directly concerned 
with increasing the material standard of living of the poor at the ‘grassroots’ level, which can be 
quantitatively measured … in general terms, the primary objective is reducing the absolute 
poverty of the world’s poor through providing lasting and secure livelihoods” (Barbier, 1987: 103 
cited in Redclift, 1992: 396). This clearly shows that sustainable economic development is really 
concerned with social economic goals rather than only environmental aspects (Redclift, 1992: 
396). 
There are very serious questions about the sustainability of the sub-Saharan African growth path. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa experienced a pattern of “continuous economic 
decline, persistent stagnation, and spurts of growth which simply proved unsustainable” (Akyüz 
& Gore, 2001: 265). The ‘alternative view’ argues that the adjustment programmes did not 
address the structural problems whichAfrican countries have confronted (Mkandawire & Soludo, 
1999: 50). According to Arbache and Page (2009: 1) the average GDP per capita growth 
(Purchasing Power Party) has been increasing in sub-Saharan Africa, along with the rest of the 
worldsince the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, African countries are still characterised by primary 
sector and tertiary sector dominance and other structural problems. This suggests that African 
countries have not developed a good structure of production which encourages sustained 
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investment. Akyüz (2006: 8) argues that developing countries need to increase investment at least 
between 20% and 25% in order to break out of the trap of low investment, low savings, and 
heavy reliance on primary export sectors.  
Contrary to the neoclassical growth model, the return to capital (and market profitability) is not 
‘naturally’ high in poor countries. Huang (2002: 547-550) argues that market failure is caused by 
the presence or the failure to develop competitive domestic firms and industries. Therefore, 
there is a need for various strong policies which directly encourage and channel investment 
towards profitable sectors, where firms are able to produce at lower cost and achieve economies 
of scale. In other word, firms should be able to invest and produce high value exports which in 
return give profitability and enable firms to increase savings; as a result firms reinvest in new 
investments and improve productivity growth (Huang, 2002). In addition, Akyüz and Gore 
(2001: 267) emphasise that investment needs to be sustained and to lead to ‘investment 
transitions’ through a long-term process of capital accumulation based on a virtuous circle of 
rising savings, investment and exports. Investment should be directed to the correct industries 
and firms that have the potential to achieve economies of scale through imitation, adaptation and 
learning process by promoting oriented exports, whereby these generates profits and savings 
which turn flow back into new investment (Akyüz & Gore 2001: 267). 
By contrast, as discussed in Section 3.2, African growth seems to be driven by ‘external’ factors 
(e.g. commodities price booms) and high domestic consumption expenditure. Sub-Saharan 
Africa boom growth has been followed by “investment slump, rather than being translated into a 
virtuous growth process” (Akyüz & Gore, 2001: 267). From that note, it is important to mention 
that the agriculture sector is a very indispensable ingredient to promote industrialisation, 
particularly at early stage of development. Thus, there is also a need for policies designed to 
increase the contribution and productivity of agriculture to the rest of the economy. This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
In the ‘World Bank view’, the failure to boost savings in sub-Saharan Africa (in contrast to 
regions that have experienced ‘investment transitions’) does not necessarily constitute a barrier to 
development (as discussed in Section 2.3). In this view, any shortfall in domestic savings would 
be supplemented by capital inflows which would be attracted by higher returns in developing 
countries. However, there is a debate about the effectiveness of capital inflow to boost 
‘development’. The idea here is that capital inflows (including foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and aid) are not necessary ‘good for development’. Firstly, there is evidence that sub-Saharan 
Africa has experienced significant capital outflows (Jomo & Rudiger, 2008: 10), many of them 
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illegal. Secondly, even when developing countries do experience capital inflows there is evidence 
that financial globalisation has not been increasing investment and promoting economic growth 
(Rodrik & Subramanian, 2008). It seems that countries which experienced rapid and sustained 
growth (investment transitions) did not depend on capital inflows (Rodrik & Subramanian, 
2008). 
 Even in the form of foreign direct investment, capital inflows may have a negative effect on 
economic activity. Capital inflow can lead to appreciation of the currency of receiving country, 
reduce profitability in the tradable sectors and promote consumption (Ibarra, 2011: 2080). For 
instance, Mexico received an enormous amount of capital inflows in the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Ibarra, 2011: 2080). But despite this, Mexico did not experience rapid economic growth. 
Instead, investment slowed down due to the low profitability caused by the appreciation of the 
currency (peso) (Ibarra, 2011: 2080). The effect of capital inflows such as foreign direct 
investment is still debatable concerning its role played in developing countries in promoting 
investment and economic growth. 
The section has argued as follows. Firstly sub-Saharan Africa may still be trapped in an economic 
vicious cycle signalled by low saving and weak industrial structure. To come out of this vicious 
cycle there is a need for good policy. Moreover, the low savings problem cannot be solved easily 
by financial globalisation and capital inflows. Secondly, the growth and investment that has been 
experienced has been based on primary sector (externally driven) and tertiary sector expansion. 
Apart from the structural problem mentioned above (related to the vicious cycle with low 
investment, low economic growth and low savings), low human development seems to be part 
of this vicious cycle. According to Human Development Report (1996) from 1960 to 1992, there 
was not a single country that moved successfully from ‘EG-lopsided’ development (i.e. with low 
levels of human development and fast economic growth) to a virtuous circle (i.e. under which 
economic growth and human development are reciprocally reinforced) (Soubbotina, 2004: 8).  
Ranis et al. (1997: 1-2) explored the link between economic growth (EG) and human 
development (HD). Ranis et al. (1997: 2) argue that there are chains of causality between EG and 
HD. Firstly, there is a relation from EG to HD. Increases in income contribute to HD through 
household and government activity and civil society. For instance, households spend their 
income on items which contribute directly to HD, e.g. food, potable water, education and health. 
These expenditures depend on the level and distribution of income between different 
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households as well as on who controls the allocation of expenditures within households (Ranis et 
al., 1997: 2). 
Secondly, there is also a relation from HD to EG, which is supported by ample evidence that 
when people become healthier, well-nourished and educated they contribute more to economic 
growth (Ranis et al., 1997: 8). In addition they argue that a higher level of HD affects the 
economy through improving people’s capabilities and consequently their creativity and 
productivity. The health and education of a population constitute an important factor for growth 
(Ranis et al., 1997: 8). 
This analysis implies that countries need to follow a ‘balanced growth’ with both economic 
growth and human development. In order to explore this empirically, Ranis et al. (1997) divided 
country performance into four categories namely virtuous, vicious and two types of lop-
sidedness. HD lop-sidedness means there is a good HD but weak growth. EG lop-sidedness 
means having strong economic growth which is not accompanied by human development 
improvement. In the vicious cycle, both human development and growth perform poorly and in 
the virtuous cycle, both human development and growth perform well (Ranis et al., 1997: 19). 
Ranis et al. (1997: 21-22) said that “Our most significant finding is that… in the case of EG-lop-
sidedness, all the cases reverted to a vicious cycle… Our analysis suggests that it is not possible 
to move to virtuous via EG lop-sidedness, as this proved a dead end.” Ranis et al. (1997: 23) 
argue that any economic development reforms or policy reforms must be focused on 
strengthening human development, not only on economic growth. This consideration is very 
important for the developing countries (especially most sub-Saharan African countries) 
experiencing growth for a certain period without significant improvements in human 
development. 
If this is correct, it is essential to enact policies that address both economic and social 
dimensions.  However, it is also important to emphasise that such policies need to be carefully 
designed. Thus, economic policies need to target more than economic growth.  They also need 
to target structural transformation. Adésínà (2007: 25) argues that it technically impossible to 
deal with the objective of poverty reduction without developing the productive capacity of the 
sub-Saharan African economies. As Chapter 3 argues, many of the factors that are described as 
causes of sub-Saharan Africa’s poor performance (such as corruption, civil wars, and ‘bad’ policy 
choices) can be regarded (at least in part) as a consequence of its lack of economic development. 
 19 
 
2.5   Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to clarify some conceptual issues around economic growth and 
sustainable development. The problem arises when it comes to asking how ‘development’ or 
‘sustainable development’ can be achieved. The chapter reviewed two different views concerning 
sustainable development. 
Firstly, the ‘World Bank view’ claims that economic growth is sufficient for long-run economic 
development. In this view economic growth is the only alternative to fight against and reduce 
poverty and inequality and trigger development. The notion of the ‘trickle-down’ effect suggests 
that growth automatically leads to economic development and countries experience qualitative 
effects (structural changes and demographic transitions). The argument is that the economy will 
go through the Lewisian turning point whereby underdeveloped countries move from being 
dominated by a traditional subsistence sector to a more urbanised and industrialised economy 
(modern sector). This expectation is derived from the standard neoclassical growth theory which 
predicts the ‘convergence property’ centred on the idea that ‘laissez-faire’ generates economic 
growth in poor countries. This suggests that with a low starting level of real GDP per capita, a 
poor country is expected to have higher economic growth. However, the only obstacle to 
convergence in this view is that of the state implementing ‘bad’ policies that ‘interfere’ with the 
market processes. This argument prevails in explanations of sub-Saharan Africa’s post-colonial 
performance. 
Secondly, the so called ‘alternative view’ argues that liberalisation and laissez-faire have been 
more harmful than curative. The ‘alternative view’ claims that economic growth by itself cannot 
automatically generate sustainable development. This view argues that economic growth is 
necessary, but it needs to be accompanied with an improvement in human development and an 
implementation of certain socio-economic policies capable to promote development. Human 
development is considered as the condition sine qua non to achieve genuine development. In 
addition, some empirical evidence has been presented to assess and confront the two opposite 
views concerning the question of sustainable development. 
As mentioned in this, chapter sub-Saharan Africa has experienced an episodic growth path, but it 
remains characterised by primary sector and tertiary sector dominance and other structural 
problems. As a result, sub-Saharan Africa is unable to build a sustained long-term accumulation 
process through a virtuous cycle of high savings, investments and exports which lead to 
‘investment transitions’. This suggests that growth must be the ‘right’ growth (it must have 
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‘qualitative’ dimensions and lead to structural change), and there is a need of right economic 
policies designed to achieve it. Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa continues to exhibit poor 
human development. That is why Ranis et al. (1997: 23) argued that any economic development 
reforms or policy reforms must be focused on strengthening human development, not only on 
economic growth. This is particularly relevant for sub-Saharan Africa as a case study to 
investigate the question of sustainable development. The next chapter is going to elaborate on 
the challenges faced by sub-Saharan Africa to achieve sustainable development. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE LITERATURE ON CHALLENGES 
 TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented an overview of the broad theory of development covering two dissimilar 
views and giving some illustrative evidence on the issues concerning how to achieve genuine 
sustainable development. Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced episodes of economic growth 
which tend to be short and unsustainable (fragile). Nevertheless, excluding South Africa, sub-
Saharan Africa’s real GDP per capita growth was expected to attain 6.4% in 2011 and 6.2% in 
2012 making sub-Saharan Africa one of the fast growing developing regions comparable with 
China, India and Brazil (World Bank, 2011: 3). This chapter attempts to analyse all the evidence 
and to explain past and recent sub-Saharan African growth, focusing on its episodic nature. In 
particular, the chapter explores the debate about whether it is still useful to consider sub-Saharan 
Africa as ‘post-colonial’ and whether its recent growth episodes mean that sub-Saharan Africa 
has shaken off the colonial legacy. The rest of the chapter is divided as follows: section 3.2 
provides an overview of African growth trends and proximal causes. Section 3.3 describes and 
analyses the political and economic post-colonial legacy in sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3.4 deals 
with the constraints. Finally, section 3.4 concludes the discussion. 
3.2   Overview of Africa’s growth trend 
Economic and social performance in post-colonial Africa can be divided into four periods. The 
first period, from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s was characterised by fast economic growth.  
Gross domestic product per capita increased by an average of 3% annually. The second period 
began roughly in the early 1970s; it was characterised by an augmentation of foreign debt, 
deterioration in terms of trade and decline of economic performance. The third period in the 
1980s is marked by the debt crisis (Mugerwa, 2001: 13-14). During this period, there were 
attempts at stabilisation and of reforms in the market (i.e. devaluation, reduction of budget 
deficits, elimination of food and transport subsidies). In the same period, the Bretton Woods 
institutions advocated the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The 
fourth period starts in the 1990s, characterised by several reforms and associated with political 
changes associated with the ‘Washington Consensus’ policies (Mugerwa, 2001: 14-15). By the 
1990s, there were signs of returns to growth. Briefly, Africa’s growth path has been episodic. 
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Between the 1960s and 1970s, the growth rate was positive, and between the early 1980s and 
1990s, GDP growth started to fall significantly. In the mid-1990s, Africa’s growth again started 
to become positive, with signs of an increased growth rate in the early twenty-first century (Fosu, 
2010: 62). But there is still a concern that this growth may be episodic and unsustainable.  
In addition to the fact that African growth seems to be episodic, sub-Saharan African growth 
patterns differs across the regions. For instance, most of the African countries which were 
considered as growth leaders during the 1960s such as Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, South 
Africa, Togo, and Zambia had fallen significantly behind by the 2000s (Fosu, 2010: 64). In 
contrast, some African countries that had been doing badly started to take the lead in terms of 
growth in the early 1990s, such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Benin, Sudan and Senegal (Fosu, 2010: 
64). Exceptionally, Botswana sustained a growth rate of about 10% annually over the entire 
period (1960-2000). Botswana has registered an average growth rate of at least 5% every ten year 
period (Fosu, 2010: 64). It is very important to note that from the 1990s up to now, most 
African countries have started to get back to the growth paths and continue to show a 
progressive growth (World Bank, 2011: 3).  
Arbache & Page (2009: 2-5) attempted to identify and analyse Africa’s growth accelerations and 
decelerations across countries. Arbache & Page (2009: 2-5) explored growth accelerations and 
decelerations before and after 1995 according to the characteristic of each African country (such 
as resource-rich economies, non-rich economies, resource-poor landlocked, non-resource-rich 
coastal, coastal economies and conflict countries). They conclude that economic growth has 
been different among Africa countries and followed divergent growth patterns. For instance 
since 1995, oil exporters grew faster than other all other African economies, at approximately 
4.5% per year. Other resource-rich countries grew at the same level as other non-resource-rich 
countries, (approximately 1.4% per year) from 1995 to 2005. Landlocked countries without 
natural resources and coastal economies grew approximately at the same level of growth. Non-
resource-rich coastal countries grew at 1.3% after 1995, compared to 0.2% between 1975 and 
1995. Countries with major conflicts experienced slow economic growth before and after 1995, 
and countries with minor conflicts recoveredsignificantly after 1995, compared to their bad 
economic growth performance in 1975-1994 (Arbache & Page, 2009: 2-5). 
The recent upsurge of good economic performance in Africa could probably be explained by 
domestic demand and externally driven factors. Arbache and Page note that investment and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) rose primarily in the resource-rich countries. A small change has 
been observed in investment as a share of GDP for all countries between 1975-1994 and 1995-
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2005. However, there was significant augmentation of FDI after 1995 (Arbache & Page, 2009: 
11-20). Besides that, strong domestic demand was observed in a number of sectors, particularly 
in the telecommunications sector over the past few years and is still rising (World Bank, 2011: 5). 
For example, mobile phone penetration in Ghana rose from 63% to 68.4% between January and 
August 2010. Similarly in Nigeria, the number of GSM mobile operators increased to 8.5 million 
new lines. Briefly, the upsurge of investment in these sectors (e.g. the telecommunications 
sector) has been simply driven by private and public consumption; most investment was directed 
to extractive industry sectors and construction sectors (World Bank, 2011: 5). 
Arbache and Page (2009: 11-20) argue that during the growth episode, most African countries 
experienced increases in exports and imports. Trade as a share of GDP increased by 8% in the 
period after 1995; however, there were more significant increases of exports as share of GDP in 
resource-rich economies than the non-resource-rich economies. The evidence is that the growth 
in trade as a share of GDP was stimulated by the augmentation of trade exports from the 
resource-rich countries and that African countries are highly dependent on a few traditional 
commodities. For instance, the rise of commodity prices and hence terms of trade has been 
important for metal, mineral, and oil exporters (e.g. Republic of Congo, Gabon, Angola and 
Zambia). Overall, growth acceleration was more significant in resource-rich economies (mineral-
rich economies) than non-resource-rich economies (without natural resources) (Arbache & Page, 
2009: 20). 
In summary, the proximate causes of growth patterns in Africa have been driven by external 
factors (such as commodity prices, trade, aid and so on) and domestic consumption.  They do 
not seem to be caused by improvements in the total factor productivity or the propensity to save. 
The main concern here is whether the current growth is different to the previous growth 
experiences. Is there any reason to think that it will lead to genuine and sustainable 
development? The next section will describe and analyse the political and economic post-colonial 
legacy in sub-Saharan Africa in order to explain and understand how it influenced growth 
patterns in the past and whether it continues to jeopardise potential sustainable development.   
3.3   Political and economic post-colonial legacy in sub-Saharan Africa 
3.3.1 Introduction  
In 1885, the African continent was divided into different territorial units by the colonial powers 
at the Berlin Conference. The division of the territories was made arbitrarily in a way that 
kingdoms, states, communities and peoples were just joined together, without taking into 
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account their socio-economic and cultural aspects. Those colonial boundaries inherited from the 
colonial powers by the newly independent African states during the 1960s constituted a challenge 
for them to achieve territorial integrity and national unity (African Renaissance, 2004: 10). In 
addition, the framework of colonial laws and institutions was not designed to overcome local 
division, but to exploit it. 
In the 1960s, sub-Saharan African colonies were portioned as sovereign states. In 1960 
seventeen sovereign states became independent and between 1961 and 1964 eight more obtained 
their independence. These new states were superficially democratic. But unfortunately this was 
followed by a series of coups d’état and constitutional revisions that led to the establishment of 
one-party states (Waites, 2012: 1). The important question here is whether and how these 
frontiers, language and culture inherited from the colonial power affected the new states and 
whether this is still a relevant factor in the contemporary world (Waites, 2012: 2).  
On the one hand, Waites (2012: 31-32) argues that the persistence of poverty and under-
development in sub-Saharan Africa can no longer be linked directly to the colonial legacy.  Post-
colonial states have had opportunities (for example, the ‘wasted’ commodity boom of the 1970s) 
to decide on policies and economic orientation which could promote development and reduce 
poverty (Waites, 2012: 31-32).  On the other hand, there is a strong case that the colonial legacies 
still prevail from the past to the present and remain visible and painful (see Waites, 2012: 25 for 
references). Collier (2006: 190) argues that African countries made the ‘wrong choices’ in the 
‘critical decade’ of the 1980s, and these choices have trapped countries in vicious cycles of 
excessive regulation, boom-bust cycles, interethnic redistribution and violent conflicts.  
However, it can be argued that ‘choice’ was very constrained in, after, and before the ‘critical 
decade’.  The notion that African countries uniformly ‘chose’ the wrong development paradigm 
(or were kleptocratic) in the 1960s and 1970s is disputed by authors like Adésínà (2009). African 
states were still struggling with nation-building and with the colonial legacy. In other words 
developing countries that had accumulated debt, whether through mismanagement or attempted 
national building were unable to make the kinds of ‘policy choices’ that led to successful 
development in countries like South Korea. This led to African countries being very 
economically vulnerable in the 1980s. Arrighi (2003: 55) argues that the 1980s were decisive in 
the history of the ‘global South’: the high interest rates that followed the Volcker deflation (1979) 
‘provoke[d] a major bifurcation in the fortunes of Southern regions in the 1980s and 1990s’. 
Thus initial conditions (e.g. frontiers, languages and cultures, weak economies and weak states) in 
the colonial experience have shaped the political and socio-economic path of sub-Saharan Africa. 
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3.3.2 The post-colonial legacy  
Sub-Saharan Africa is politically divided into 48 states with a combined population of only half 
that of India. Sub-Saharan Africa is very fragmented and ethnically diverse compared to South 
Asia (Waites, 2012: 11-12). The colonial period and the process of decolonisation had an 
important impact on the political and ideological foundation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Considering that African countries had been dominated under colonialism, in most of the 
African countries the new emerging leadership was trying to build a new sense of nationalist 
identity (Moss, 2007: 29). This was a new emerging force to fight against colonialism, which 
started to develop from the growing number of educated Africans.  
African nationalism was a cultural and political movement which was trying to re-establish 
Africa’s right not to be dominated or controlled by foreigners and to fight against all colonial 
ideology that oppressed African freedom and self-worth (Moss, 2007: 29). But there is 
something important which needs to be mentioned. Most African countries gained their 
independence without having to defeat the colonial regimes, albeit in many cases independence 
was an unwilling gift (reluctant) from their colonisers. Nonetheless, the coloniser handed over 
power to their chosen African successors, to some extent educated and trained in their political 
system. As a result, the colonisers still maintained their economic power on the new independent 
states and these successors continued to serve their interests of their colonisers (Rowley, 2000: 
138). For example, in Cameroon the French managed to maintain control through their proxy 
AhidjoAhmadou, and used this experience as a model for decolonisation of their other African 
territories (Conchiglia, 2012). In most African countries, independence was declared and 
accompanied through nationalist movements. The primary aim of the nationalist movements was 
to constitute national cohesion and to implement plans of development once in power. The state 
declared that it would stand above all divergence and narrow interest groups and classes (Waites, 
2012: 8-9). These nationalist movements attempted to promote national cohesion, but 
unfortunately they did not achieve it.  
The accession of new elites to administrative power conferred great opportunities to benefit and 
to exploit public office for their own gain during the period of prosperity (i.e. boom of 
commodity prices) and led to political rent-seeking (Waites, 2012: 35). Unfortunately, 
decolonisation and transfer of power and sovereignty to the new states brought segmentation 
and fragmentation within these newly independent states. For example, ethno-regional conflicts 
broke out in Sudan, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon and other African 
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states soon after independence (Waites, 2012: 36; Conchiglia, 2012). The political conflicts 
between regional and ethnic based parties tended to destroy the nationalist struggle.  
Even in African countries that had not experienced major military conflicts, major issues of 
governance arose. In particular, there was the problem of self-interest of African elites. 
Therefore, politics become completely patrimonial which lead to ‘big men’ in positions of power 
exploiting the public resources for their own interest (Waites, 2012: 192). The ‘big men’ position 
give them power over the public resources, as if they were privates assets, attached to their own 
and kinsmen’s pockets and promoted social redistribution of goods to favoured clients (Waites, 
2012: 192). Nevertheless, the politics system in Africa has emerged as oligarchic system rather 
than a dictatorial system. For instance, the president was surrounded by politicians, businessmen, 
military officers and bureaucrats utilising clientelistic networks to reinforce and reciprocally 
offering each other support in exchange for political power and wealth (Waites, 2012: 192).  
In the post-colonial periodAfrican leaders have failed to improve the quality of life of people 
who reside in the urban and rural areas (Ukaga & Afoaku, 2005: 13). The nature of political 
power in many African states is characterised by centralising power (single party dominance) and 
self-interest leading to the patrimonial culture of ‘big men’. This must probably be associated 
with the lack of democracy, lack of transparency, absence of peaceful means to change or replace 
leadership and absence of accountability (Mills, 2010: 1-4; African Renaissance, 2004: 12). For 
example, Nigerian oil revenues have been estimated at $400 billion over the last 40 years. From 
1965 to 2000, oil revenues per capita increased from $33 to $325. Despite that, the number of 
Nigerians living on less than one dollar per day increased from 19 million (of a population of 70 
million) to 90 million (of a population of 120 million) (Mills, 2010: 3). This reveals that the oil 
revenues did not really benefit the majority of the population. 
These elites inherited from the political system of colonial regimes, concentrated all the power 
and attempted to repress economically and politically those who competed or challenged them 
for the apparatus of government (Rowley, 2000: 137). One of the reasons is that the state 
became the main channel of access to wealth and status. Unqualified and inexperienced staffs 
were promoted quickly to high positions as a result of ethnic favouritism, political patronage and 
nepotism (Waites, 2012: 191-192). For instance in Nigeria, at every level there was patronage and 
nepotism favouring home communities (Waites, 2012: 231-232).  
The result was the weakening of state institutions in the sense that there was no distinction 
between public sources and private wealth. For example, the resources of the country are split 
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between the president and those around him (Moss, 2007: 38). Moreover, data shows sub-
Saharan Africa countries with a low average score of corruption in public transactions compared 
to all developing countries, except Botswana and Namibia. Cameroon, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Madagascar and Angola achieved the worst scores (Project Syndicate, 2005). 
The real question is why African countries tended to have these characteristics. One the one 
hand, several authors has blamed African states for wasting the chance to develop their 
countries.  Often African leaders tended to associated others (e.g. external factors) responsible of 
their failings (Mills, 2010: 1-4). Africa is not poor or underdeveloped because of lack of natural 
resource; instead these natural resources have been often used for self-enrichment of African 
elites, spreading corruption practices and causing deviate away from socio-economic 
development strategies (Mills, 2010: 1-4). Waites (2012: 232-233) suggests that Nigerians were 
naively indifferent to any unethical or immoral behaviour in public life (e.g. corruption).  
On the other hand, authors such as Adésínà argue that not all African governments wasted their 
chance to consolidate democracy and to pursue development strategies. Indeed, in several 
African countries national unity and social development were very important to consolidate a 
new nation state and overcome ethnic or regional loyalties (Adésínà, 2009: S37-S39). The new 
African leaders were determined to promote education and economic development creates jobs 
opportunities, national cohesion and reduces poverty and the inequalities set up by the colonial 
legacy (Adésínà, 2009: S41). The national and local governments were keen to provide universal 
access to primary education (e.g. Tanzania, Ghana, and Nigeria) (Adésínà, 2009: S41-S42). For 
instance between 1965 and 1975 in Nigeria, public funds were allocated to promote universal 
access to primary education (Adésínà, 2009: S41-S42). The problem was not that all African 
leaders were unwilling to develop their countries. It was that conditions were against them.  
The Democratic Republic of Congo is the most obvious case. Although, independence was 
given by the Belgian colonial regime, the Belgians rulers were not ready to encourage Congolese 
political autonomy. Instead, the granting of independence was precipitated by the surge of 
events. As a result there were very few elite Congolese (i.e. with secondary education or 
experience in public administration). Furthermore, the territory was characterised by extreme 
ethnic-linguistic diversity. In addition, the colonial power also attempted to maintain control 
over resources. For instance, several companies were inter-connected passing through the giant 
Belgian premier capitalist institution Société Générale and the colonial regime was the main 
shareholder in the corporate economy (Waites, 2012: 234). After the first election, the country 
fell predictably into total fragmentation and civil war (Waites, 2012: 228-270). The 
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misgovernment and kleptocratic excesses of the subsequent Mobutu regime, and the descent 
into ‘Africa’s first world war’ in the 1990s, should be regarded not as the cause, but as the result, 
of these initial conditions. 
In contrast, because of the different colonial practices of the British in West Africa, Nigeria had 
had practically a decade of experience with competitive party politics and democratic elections 
when it acceded to independence. Since the late 1940s, their political leaders had been 
familiarised with the exercise of self-government and because of policies of indigenisation, there 
was less foreign interference in the economy (Waites, 2012: 227-230). Despite this, Nigeria also 
descended into civil war and kleptocracy. Cultural and political differences among Nigeria’s 
dominant ethnic groups were sharp. The Eastern region was dominated by the National Council 
of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) which represented the Ibo ethnic group. The Western region was 
dominated by the Action Group (AG) which was the main drive for Yoruba political activism. 
The Northern region was dominated by the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) representing the 
Hausa-Fulani Islamic elites (Waites, 2012: 230-231). Elected Nigerian politicians abused the 
powers of public office (e.g. bribery in the allocation of public contracts and other malfeasances), 
self-enrichment and led to corrupt practices (Waites, 2012: 231-232). This resulted in several 
back-to-back military coups and civil war. These sequences of events led to increased ethnic 
tension and violence (Waites, 2012: 255-270). 
Another interesting case (and, not coincidentally, also one of Africa’s ‘big three’ in terms of sheer 
size and diversity) is Sudan. According to El-Affendi (2002:7-9), Sudanese society is 
characterised by values of civility, generosity, loyalty and solidarity within family, tribes and the 
religious fraternity. El Affendi argues that there is very strong ‘civil society’ in Sudan based on 
ethnic and religious group solidarity and regional loyalties which tend to be closely identified 
witha particular traditional groups or communities. These are not good for democracy or 
development. Therefore democracy tends to result in political stagnation, whereby the main 
traditional groups or communities use political power for their own rent-seeking. In other words, 
these civil society values (solidarity and loyalty) do not converge to the national interest but lead 
to fragmentation (e.g. conflicts within ethnic and tribal groups) when they are brought into the 
apparatus of state. This has encouraged successive military coups. The military regime thentries 
to restore order and to consolidate national unity; however, military regimes prove incapable of 
overcoming the underlying fragmenting forces (El-Affendi, 2002: 9-10). 
In summary, because of their fragmentation and weak social development, a pattern of 
corruption, favouritism, civil war, etc. emerges. For example, politicians are being ‘loyal’ and 
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‘honest’ in their own eyes when they serve only their kin.  This means that democracy tends to 
be weak as El-Affendi illustrates. Because democracy proves unsatisfactory, there is a tendency 
to resort to authoritarian solutions such as military coups.  
Some authors have used the East Asian development state as an example of how 
‘authoritarianism’ is capable of imposing certain disciplines (series of reforms) on groups of 
firms and the business class (capitalist class) for national interest rather than individual and group 
interests (Chibber, 1999: 310-311). However, Chibber (1999: 311) argues that the Korean state 
did not simply impose a discipline over the business class, but made the capitalist or business 
class work together and to pursue an Export-Led Industrialisation (ELI) strategy for the national 
interest and mutual benefit rather than individualistic interests. Briefly, the Korean state under 
President Park was able to realign business class interests away from internal ‘rent seeking’ 
toward activities consistent with the national interest and hence to achieve the industrial 
transformation of Korea (Chibber, 1999: 338-339). By contrast, African states did not succeed in 
overcoming regional and group fragmentation (e.g. ethnic and tribal conflicts) and failed to 
consolidate democracy. African leaders have been trapped in a vicious cycle and unable to 
promote sustainable development. 
This section has described the nature of the political system which emerged after the colonial 
period and how Africa’s colonial experience had an important influence on political and socio-
economic conditions across the African continent. Political tribalism and what Waites (2012: 
214) calls ‘moral ethnicity’ were major obstacles to the consolidation of solidarity and national 
interest after independence. There is no dispute that African politicians faced these challenges. 
However, it is very flawed to use the post-colonial experience as a permanent excuse to justify 
African leaders’ failures. To some extent, it is also wrong to simply adhere to the view that good 
governance, accountability, transparency and free-marketsas suggested by the ‘World Bank view’ 
will promote development. Nonetheless, from all of these, there is a strong sense that 
development needs the implementation of good economic policies. African leaders did attempt 
to make good decisions at some level, but failed to avoid the post-colonial traps. The next 
section will describe individually the strong effect of post-colonialism on the subsequent 
trajectory in economic, political and social aspects of growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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3.4   Constraints to Sub-Saharan African economic development  
3.4.1 Introduction 
The previous sections have provided an overview of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic growth 
trends and the proximate cause of that growth. They have described the political and economic 
post-colonial legacy in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The next section will attempt to define what is 
called the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ constraints to sub-Saharan African development. On the one 
hand, SSA’s economic growth has been extremely dependent on external conditions which 
makes sub-Saharan Africa very vulnerable to any external shocks (such as the terms of trade, pre-
conditions for getting aid, in terms of competitiveness and so on). This can be defined as 
‘external’ constraints.  On the other hand, the post-colonial syndrome was discussed in section 
3.3, and as explained, the political and societal structures inherited from the colonial period have 
left weak states unable to transform their economies. The internal constraints can be designated 
as political instability, concentration of political power, ethnic fragmentation, structural 
problems, poor infrastructure, failure to address the social issues and so forth. Furthermore, the 
external and internal factors are not independent of each other. The main reason that sub-
Saharan Africa remains externally dependent is because of its internal constraints. The following 
sub-sections will try to analyse in detail and individually the structural problems (especially in the 
industrial and agriculture sectors) and social challenges faced in sub-Saharan Africa.  
3.4.2 Fragile industrialisation and extreme dependency on external conditions 
The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Conference on 
Tradeand Development (UNCTAD) argue that low-income countries are significantly vulnerable 
to external shocks such as terms-of-trade fluctuations, decline of commodity prices, changes in 
international aid flows and conditionalities, and other adverse shocks. This has a negative impact 
on macroeconomic stability, debt sustainability and poverty reduction in developing countries 
(Raddatz, 2007: 156). The fact that African economies are still dependent on primary exports is 
evidently the result of their failure to adjust their economic structure. It is also related to the 
political factors discussed in the previous section. However, external shocks do not explain 
entirely the poor economic performance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. Many 
authors argue that Africa’s economic performance is caused by the lack of good economic policy 
implemented, poor infrastructure, poor quality of education and low skilled labour force, conflict 
and political instability and rent-seeking behaviour (Bigsten & Durevall, 2003, and Acemoglou, 
Johnson & Robinson, 2001 cited in Round, 2007: 4). Raddatz (2007: 156) argues that African 
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policy makers did not attempt to deal with the external factors and failed to implement policies 
which could transform their productive structures. 
Most successful developing countries (particularly in East Asia) have maintained fast and 
sustained economic growth by developing a structure of production (industrialisation: shifting 
away from the primary sector to manufacturing, more technology and capital-intensive activities 
across sectors) which has promoted competitiveness in a range of activities (Akyüz & Gore, 
2001: 266-267). Many African countries remain highly dependent on commodity exports as the 
main source of foreign exchange earnings and are reliant on external financing (Kousari, 2005: 
169-170). For example, African countries such as Angola and Nigeria are heavily dependent on 
oil exports, and countries such Burkina Faso and Mali are deeply dependent on cotton exports. 
In general, African countries are highly dependent on exports of one or two commodities. They 
are therefore very vulnerable to any external shocks and this has been reinforced by their failure 
to diversify their export products in international markets (World Bank, 2011: 14-15). The 
decline in commodity prices and the failure to obtain enough foreign exchange contributed to 
decreases in the levels of savings and investment necessary for human and physical infrastructure 
development (Kousari, 2005: 169-170). That is why several developing countries have been 
unable to sustain economic growth through a long-term process of accumulation, rising savings 
and investment in the virtuous circle manner (Akyüz & Gore, 2001: 267). This process has been 
missing in SSA production structures, except in Botswana and Mauritius (Akyüz & Gore, 2001: 
267).  
The presence of poor physical infrastructure constitutes another important constraint to 
structural transformation and to sustainable economic development in Africa economies. Many 
African countries rely on infrastructure inherited from the colonial period. Sub-Saharan African 
infrastructure is typically deficient in three dimensions, namely quantity, quality and accessibility. 
For example, an indicator of quality is the percentage of roads that are paved. Data show that 
only 12% of roads in SSA were paved in 2000, compared to 68.4%, 34% and 31% in the Middle 
East, East Asia and South Asia respectively (Ajakaiye & Ncube, 2010: i5). In terms of quantity, 
electricity consumption per capita in sub-Saharan Africa was only 534Kwh compared with 
1,665.5Kwh for East Asia in 2000. And lastly in terms of mobile phone accessibility, in 2008 the 
cellular pre-paid tariff was $11.8 in sub-Saharan Africa while in East Asia it was only $5 (Ajakaiye 
& Ncube, 2010: i5-i6). Ajakaiye & Ncube (2010: i7) argued that infrastructure has contributed to 
reduced inequality far more in East and South Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Another important ‘qualitative’ issue that brings into doubt whether Africa’s recent growth has 
entailed structural transformation is in terms of the sectoral structure of the economy. Sub-
Saharan Africa’s manufacturing sector declined from 17.5% of GDP in 1965 to 13.1% of GDP 
in 2005 (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012: ii64). By 2011, the figure was down to 11.8% (World 
Development Indicators, 2012). Low and declining manufacturing shares of GDP are a concern. 
African countries need to modernise the structure and features of the manufacturing industry in 
such a way that they can diversify and transform their products before exporting, so that African 
products can be competitive in international markets (African Renaissance, 2004: 39). By 
contrast, East Asia moved from agriculture production activities into more industrial production 
activities (Aryeetey and Moyo, 2012: ii64). These differences in the evolution of economic 
structure are discussed further in Chapter 4. This also refers us back to the Lewisian model of 
modernisation mentioned in Chapter 2. African governments have failed to transform low 
productivity raw material-based economies into modern high productivity economies (Aryeetey 
& Moyo, 2012: ii64). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, African governments prioritised industrialisation, but based it on 
import-substitution which included import tariffs, exchange rate controls and subsidies (Aryeetey 
& Moyo, 2012: ii64-ii65). This did not help domestic industries to compete with foreign 
industries even with a protectionist policy imposed by the state. However, sub-Saharan Africa’s 
manufacturing sector collapsed because of several issues such as the presence of uncompetitive 
firms, appreciation of the exchange rate and high government debt. In the 1980s, African 
governments shifted away from protectionist policies.  
From 1981 to 1991, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were advocated by the World 
Bank (Schatz, 1994: 679). The objective of the SAPs was to stimulate countries’ GDP growth, 
exports, savings and investment ratios. However, the critics argued that the adjustment 
programmes did not address the structural problem which African countries confronted 
(Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999: 49-55). 
In other words, the manufacturing sector was not structured in such a manner that it could 
compete with other foreign firms (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012: ii69). In addition, African countries 
did not diversify their exports away from the primary sector (extractive sectors: raw materials) 
(Mugerwa, 2001: 16). It seems that the import-substitution policies and the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes followed by African countries have not caused structural 
transformation. For example in Ghana, the share of GDP in industry and the agriculture sector 
has decreased, while the share of GDP in the services sector has grown (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012: 
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ii69). This seems to indicate that structural transformation in Ghana remains questionable, 
despite it experiencing positive economic growth during the last two decades (Aryeetey & Moyo, 
2012: ii69). Chapter 4 shows that this pattern is typical in Africa.  
This reinforces the idea that African countries have failed to achieve structural transformation by 
shifting from the traditional sector to the modern sector. African countries wanted to build a 
modern sector capable of creating jobs without first fulfilling the pre-conditions (to invest in and 
develop the agricultural or rural sector). Because of this, people moved from the traditional 
sector (rural areas) to the modern sector (urban areas) without any skills to match the modern 
sector’s requirements (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012: ii66). This situation led to high unemployment 
and reduced productivity which reduced economic growth and deepened Africa’s poverty. In 
contrast, East Asian economies invested in improving agricultural productivity before moving to 
industrial productivity. This helped set a foundation to facilitate the structural transformation 
process (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012:  ii66). For instance, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan actively 
promoted rural-industrialisation by directly allocating resources to the rural areas (traditional 
sector) (Hung, 2009: 12-13). Furthermore, high domestic savings rates allowed East Asian 
countries to support a strong investment-profit nexus (Akyüz & Gore, 2001: 266-267).  
3.4.3 Agriculture performance 
After independence, African agricultural performance started to decline. The decline of African 
agriculture was often associated with policies which promoted the industrial sector (urban 
development) rather than improving the agricultural sector (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999: 14). 
The decline of Africa’s agricultural production can be partly explained by colonial policies which 
were designed to satisfy the colonial regimes or the metropole to the detriment of Africa (Ukaga 
& Afoaku, 2005: 191-192). Furthermore, in the ‘Africa of the labour reserves’ (including such 
countries as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya) lands had been dispossessed from the African 
indigenous people who were forced into poor regions without means and modernisation to 
develop their farming (Arrighi et al., 2010: 412). This contrasts with countries such as China and 
Korea. Huang (2010: 87-91) argues that China was ‘biased’ towards agriculture up to about 1990. 
Since then it has gradually shifted to favouring the cities.   
Rural African indigenous people were left with no choice other than to become temporary or 
permanent migrants, providing a cheap labour force to the urban (modern) sector (Arrighi et al., 
2010: 412). African farmers were forced to produce crops that the colonial regimes needed rather 
than what African indigenous people needed (Ukaga & Afoaku, 2005: 191). This created an 
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imbalance between the local populations’ needs, the local environment and the resources 
available for agricultural production (Ukaga & Afoaku, 2005: 191-192). Arrighi et al. (2010: 417-
420) argue that firstly, the shortage of labour force in the traditional sector, created by further 
increases of labour force in the modern sector, undermined subsistence agriculture to the point 
where traditional agriculture collapsed and this caused urban wages to rise. Urban workers now 
needed enough means to improve their living conditions rather than live as migrant peasants. 
Urban workers needed to earn wages sufficient to cover their full cost of subsistence, which 
provided them with secure wages during their working life and old age and, above all, helped 
them to support their families outside of the peasant sector (Arrighi et al., 2010: 419). Secondly, 
urban wages rose due to the transformation in the nature of industry (such as the use of 
mechanisation and automation in mining and manufacturing which created a strong demand for 
an African labour force with skills) and the changes in class, racial relations and government 
policies (Arrighi et al., 2010: 417-420). 
These points arguably make the Lewisian model and the ‘World Bank view’ regarding 
modernisation irrelevant to southern Africa’s development experience. The main dispute is with 
the idea that growth in the modern sector attracted surplus labour from the agricultural sector 
(rural areas) to the modern sector (urban areas), because of economic growth in the modern 
sector. Unfortunately, after independence, many new political leaders failed to promote and 
implement the reforms needed in the agriculture sector (Ukaga & Afoaku, 2005: 192).  
There is an argument that African agriculture has been suffering from a systemic ‘urban biased’ 
policy. The idea is that any policy which goes against agricultural development tends to stop 
economic growth and poverty reduction (Bezemer & Headey, 2008: 142-143). In addition,most 
agricultural policies failed because of lack of investment in the sector to increase productivity and 
to support an augmentation in net agricultural surplus (Akyüz & Gore, 2001: 274-275). Much of 
the resources collected from the agricultural sector through exorbitant taxation on export crops 
were reinvested into urban-industrial or urban consumption. 
 In contrast with East Asia, the tax funds collected for the agricultural sector were divided in 
two; one part was oriented to improve basic infrastructure of production and the other part was 
invested in the urban-industrial sector (Akyüz & Gore, 2001: 275). Briefly, this ‘urban biased’ 
policy resulted in the persistence of a big gap between the rural and urban sectors in terms of 
welfare. The rural areas remained struggling to access basic education, health, infrastructure and 
other social services compared to urban areas (Bezemer & Headey, 2008: 150). It is important to 
note that; most of the international donors between the 1980s and 1990s shifted their funding 
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from African agricultural development towards the health, environment and social sectors, while 
public investment in rural infrastructure declined due to a decrease in public expenditure (see 
Dembélé & Staatz, 2008: 23 and Akyüz & Gore, 2001: 280). Bezemer & Headey (2008: 1351) 
found that the levels of aid allocated to the agriculture sector and other productive sectors 
declined to the detriment of social sector assistance. The reduction of aid to agriculture in favour 
of more social sector spending has been supported as a way of reducing poverty and achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As argued by Bezemer & Headey (2008: 1342): 
… there has been inefficient and systemic bias against agriculture... The bias is 
inefficient because no currently advanced country of some size became advanced 
without the agriculture sector first achieving substantial productivity gains in the early 
stages of development. The bias is systemic because it has fundamental institutional 
causes grounded in the political economies... 
The failure to transform agriculture in Africa is linked to poverty and unemployment. The 
agricultural sector remains under-developed and unable to satisfy the needs of the majority of the 
African population living in the traditional sector. As result, the unskilled labour surplus moving 
from the agricultural sector becomes a burden on the urban sector, increasing the level of 
poverty and unemployment (Janvry & Sadoulet, 2010: ii10-ii11). Agricultural growth is very 
important to boost SSA’s GDP, as it constitutes a large sector in the economy which can have a 
spill-over effect on other economic sectors. The agricultural sector represents approximately 
62% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), which is mainly 
constituted of poor people living in the rural areas, producing only 27% of total GDP of these 
countries. Nearly a third of the African population lives on less than one dollar a day, and 
poverty still has a strong impact in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the rural areas with a 
malnourished population (Janvry & Sadoulet, 2010: ii12-ii13; Dembélé & Staatz, 2008: 3).  
Furthermore, the colonial legacy affected African industrialisation policies (Bezemer & Headey, 
2008: 1352-1355). The prevalence of civil conflicts, poverty, corruption; and inter-ethnic 
conflicts has contributed to deteriorate and hinder agricultural performance and development. 
Widespread corruption has contributed to the misappropriation of resources supposed to 
finance the agricultural sector and deterred any entrepreneurship and private investments, and in 
addition, diseases such as malaria, intestinal parasites, guinea worn, bilharzia and HIV/AIDS 
affect labour force productivity (Ukaga & Afoaku, 2005: 201-205). Civil wars and political 
instability have destroyed and stopped Africa’s agricultural development. Countries such as 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo, Angola and Zimbabwe have experienced civil wars and political instability which have 
reduced and undermined agricultural productivity (e.g. reduced human, material, financial 
capacity and other resources needed to improve the agricultural sector) (Ukaga & Afoaku, 2005: 
201-205). 
3.4.4 Political and social aspects 
 The political aspects have an important influence on the social aspects in terms of structuring 
efficient social policies capable of inducing sustainable development. Furthermore, effective 
social policy is driven by social actors (political institutions, NGOs, aid donors and transnational 
corporations) and cultural values of society. The political institutions or political regimes (elitist, 
populist, democratic, authoritarian, colonialist, nationalist and so on) determine and indicate 
which types and how social policies will be implemented and achieved (Mkandawire, 2001: 18-
20). The post-colonial period was very critical, particularly in the political aspects in Africa. 
African political leaders attempted to promote social policies as a channel for social cohesion and 
nation building during the early nationalist phase (Adésínà, 2009: S47). However, the social 
aspects continue to be undermined by politics. The post-colonial period with the inheritance of 
borders and institutional structures (e.g. political centralisation) continues to have a big impact 
on the success of African development and the building of national unity (Project Syndicate, 
2005).  As discussed above in section 3.3, African political leaders have created a system which 
has developed cults of personality to maintain themselves in power for decades, as the 
consequence of cronyism and corruption, which removes anypotential of implementing effective 
economic and social development (Project Syndicate, 2005). Post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa 
has been marked by weak states unable to provide social and infrastructure services and meet the 
needs of their populations. When the state becomes unable to provide social services such as 
healthcare, education, and human security, to its own population, state legitimacy is undermined 
and this can lead to domestic conflicts (Adésínà, 2009: S48). 
Between the 1960s and 1970s, economic growth was considered as the main driver to achieve 
development. It was assumed that wellbeing and equity would be achieved automatically via 
‘trickle-down’ (Mkandawire, 2001: 10-11). However, with time, it has been realised that 
economic growth has not automatically led to development. On the contrary, by the end of the 
1970s, the economic growth period had been accompanied by income inequality and poverty. 
Hence, late in the 1970s, economists and policymakers started to think that there was a need to 
implement policies which could effectively address the issues of poverty and inequality 
(Mkandawire, 2001: 11). Human development therefore became the centre of interest. 
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Social protection became important in African development programmes because of the 
persistence of many African people living in poverty and very vulnerable (Ellis et al., 2009: 3). 
Basically, social service delivery targeted vulnerable people called the ‘deserving poor’, rather 
than the entire population (Adésínà, 2007: 16). The ‘World Bank’ policies based on stabilisation 
and liberalisation started to consider the social dimensions, but despite that, African countries 
did not experience good results or improvement in social performance (Adésínà, 2007: 16). The 
imposing of user-fees or cost-sharing has worsened the living conditions of poor people. 
Structural Adjustment Programmes were based on fiscal contraction of government (reducing 
public spending on the social services such as in healthcare services and education services) and 
they did not bring any relief in terms of reducing poverty and inequality. The burden of 
healthcare provision moved away from a national fiscal responsibility to the end-user, and this 
has increased the burden on women to supply and fulfil their home needs (Adésínà, 2009: S44-
S45). The premise of those user-fees did not improve equality, resource mobilisation, quality of 
care or efficient use of services, and did not reduce poverty (Adésínà, 2009: S45). For example, in 
2002, Nigeria spent only 1.2% of total GDP on healthcare. The diminution of health 
provisioning has reduced the capacity of many African governments to respond effectively to the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic (Adésínà, 2009: S45). 
The debate here is how to formulate a social policy capable of achieving equity and reducing 
poverty. This is not only about the Bretton Woods Institutions’ view or donor countries in 
general; the reality is that SSA is heavily dependent on aid and external resources. African 
governments have failed to implement social policies capable of improving the life of poor 
people, due to weak administration (Adésínà, 2009: S47). Governments have been unable to 
mobilise the necessary resources to finance and implement these social policies. This situation 
has undermined the capacity of governments to provide efficient social policies. Some studies on 
social policies have shown that even good state administrations were unable to develop good 
social policies. Most of the state’s social policies suffered from under-coverage, where people 
who deserve to receive help are left out and the social benefits go to those are not the target 
group (Adésínà, 2009: S47).  
Overall, it is important that African countries improve the productive capacity of the economy. 
This must involve structural changes in the economy, moving from extractive activities to 
manufacturing activities which can lead to economic development. An effective social policy 
objective must be sustainable and capable of reducing poverty and inequality. In addition, the 
achievement of sustainable development capable of reducing poverty and inequality depends on 
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a solid social policy regime (Adésínà, 2009: S49). Noyoo (2000: 454) argues that people 
constitute the means and the end of development (improving education, health, nutrition are 
ends in themselves). Healthy and educated people are the source of achieving development. The 
government must implement national policies which take into account individuals, local 
communities, cooperatives, private enterprises and non-state organisations capable of pursuing 
social objectives and providing good services, hence, to satisfy their welfare, cultural and 
economic requirements (Noyoo, 2000: 454-455). 
3.5   Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to give an overview of the literature on sub-Saharan Africa’s growth 
paths and the pattern of economic development. Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth paths have been 
episodic and not sustainable for a long period. Most sub-Saharan African countries have recently 
experienced growth accelerations. However, the concern remains as to whether sub-Saharan 
Africa growth is durable. The chapter has attempted to describe and investigate how the political 
and economic post-colonial issues have affected the growth pattern and the development of sub-
Saharan Africa. As demonstrated in the chapter, the post-colonial legacy has played an important 
role in the political and socio-economic trajectory of sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the colonial 
legacy in sub-Saharan Africa, the chapter has also described some constraints faced by sub-
Saharan Africa. In economic terms, these challenges have been considered as structural problems 
which include internal and external constraints. Internal constraints include a lack of good 
infrastructure, and lack of structural transformation in agriculture and industry. External 
constraints include the dependence of sub-Saharan Africa on external conditions (e.g. terms of 
trade, aid, foreign direct investment, commodities prices and so on). In the social aspects, the 
human development or social indicators continue to perform badly. 
 
In other words, the new political leaders have failed to promote genuine development expected 
by their population since the post-colonial period. As briefly reviewed in this chapter, sub-
Saharan Africa is still struggling to improve the social conditions, despite attempts to implement 
new social policies and improve social conditions for the population (e.g. education and health). 
Unfortunately, the politics have influenced the social aspects. Politics has interfered and shifted 
away from the general interest and focused on individual agendas. As mentioned, political leaders 
have been interested in gaining power rather than implementing socio-economic development 
policies capable of generating genuine development. In short, the economic development of sub-
Saharan Africa lies in its own hands. It is not fair to put the blame only on African political 
leaders for their failures to promote development, nor on the post-colonial period as the main 
 39 
 
cause which undermines any potential to promote African development. Both African leaders 
and the post-colonial period have played a critical role in Africa socio-economic development. 
Moreover, it is also a fallacy to say that ‘good governance and accountability’ and the ‘free 
market’ will promote development. Most important is that African leaders must implement the 
‘right’ socio-economic policies needed by the country and capable of generating sustainable 
development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF GROWTH 
PATTERNS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
4.1   Introduction 
Recall that the research is addressing the question of sustainable development, particularly in 
terms of economic growth and human development. The previous chapters have helped to build 
hypotheses and to examine the economic development trajectory in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Firstly, the debate rests on how economic development should be achieved. This has led us to 
two opposite views, the ‘World Bank view’ and the ‘alternative view’. On one hand, the ‘World 
Bank view’ maintains that rapid economic growth will stimulate development and on the other 
hand, the ‘alternative view’ is that development does not occur automatically. Economic growth 
is not sufficient; it needs to be accompanied by qualitative change observed in the political and 
social aspects (education, healthcare and so on). Secondly, a descriptive overview and assessment 
has been conducted on post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa growth trends and socio-economic 
trajectories. 
As noted, many African economies have recently recorded fast economic growth, however, the 
main concern in this chapter is to assess whether the current growth episodes are sustainable. In 
order to do this, this chapter used the World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World 
Bank, 2012). Section 4.2 presents a data description. Section 4.3 outlines the methodology for 
the study. Section 4.4 presents the empirical findings. Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the chapter 
and outlines the results. 
4.2   Data description 
This section is simply describing and presenting some relevant data on the socio-economic 
performance of sub-Saharan Africa and attempts to do a comparison with other regions and 
countries in form of charts and tables. The dataset use in the study is presented in the 
appendices. Appendix 18 contains the list of countries used in the study and Appendix 19 is the 
list of variables. The list of countries includes 77 countries in 5 different regions such as East 
Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and high income 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries for which GDP 
per capita (constant 2000 US$) was available for every year from 1960 to 2011. World 
 41 
 
Development Indicators include a wide range of variables on economic and humandevelopment 
indicators. However, for many of these, data is missing (especially from sub-Saharan African 
countries). Furthermore, the intention is to provide an overview of the main statistical patterns 
rather than to report on all of the data in the WDI database. A smaller set of variables is used in 
the econometric model (section 4.3). 
There are several limitations in the research study. Firstly, it was not possible to analyse other 
countries and variables because data were missing, sporadic and sometime started earlier or later 
than the period under study. For example, for most African countries, data on human 
development such as on school enrolment are missing and sporadic for certain years. Economic 
infrastructure data (such as paved roads and telephones as a share of GDP) for most African 
countries are missing from the 1960s to the 1990s. On economic structure variables, data on the 
manufacturing sector as a share of GDP only started from 1980s to 2011 and are missing for 
certain years and countries (e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Zambia, Cameroon, 
Republic of Congo and Angola).  
Secondly, even when data are not missing there are major questions about their quality. The 
Human Development Index seems also to be rebased periodically without explanation (e.g. 
UNDP report 2009 and UNDP report 2011). There are also major questions about the World 
Bank data, for example, how they evaluate the degree of economic openness and per capita 
income for different countries. Kiely (2004: 5), for example, argues that the way that the World 
Bank compiles GDP data is not transparent and may introduce systematic biases. This is 
particularly so with purchasing power parity (PPP) based figures. These issues are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. However, because it is not clear how accurate data are, it is important to 
be careful in interpreting the results.  
The rest of this section uses tables and graphs to give an impression of sub-Saharan African 
socio-economic performance compared to other regions and countries, and whether sub-Saharan 
Africa’s recent growth is ‘catching up’ and ‘sustainable’. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 attempt to develop 
and test the hypotheses more formally. 
4.2.1 Economic indicators 
This section aims to come up with an overview on whether the recent economic growth in sub-
Saharan Africa has been driven by structural transformation of the economy. 
 42 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Sub-Saharan Africa region compared with other regions in terms of GDP per capita 
(current US dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the sub-Saharan Africa region showed an economic acceleration since 
the mid-1990s. This recovery follows the trend of the global economy. This also suggests that 
sub-Saharan Africa has benefited from the growth in the emerging countries such as China and 
India through trade and investment (African Economic Outlook, 2013). In addition, sub-Saharan 
Africa’s growth has been characterised by strong commodity prices, new resource exploitation 
and improvement of domestic conditions (IMF, 2012: 1-2). Despite the global crisis of 2008 and 
2009, sub-Saharan African growth has been robust. It is expected that sub-Saharan Africa’s 
growth will rebound to 4.5% in 2012 and to 4.8% in 2013 (African Economic Outlook, 2013). 
However, it is important to note that in comparison with other regions (except South Asia); sub-
Saharan Africa’s GDP per capita remains low (see Appendix 4 for details). 
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Figure 4.2: Some sub-Saharan Africa countries have experienced fast GDP per capita (current US 
Dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
As shown above in Figure 4.2, the period from 2005 to 2011 observed a significant rebound of 
growth in most of sub-Saharan Africa countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo and Angola (see also Appendix 2 for details). For 
instance, Angola’s GDP per capita rose from 579.330 to 1049.076 between the periods 1990-
1995 and 2000-2005. It increased to 3792.627 between 2005 and 2010 and to 5147.71 in 2011. 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Republic of Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Lesotho 
and Botswana are other examples of countries that experienced rapid growth in this period (see 
also Appendix 2). Let us illustrate these countries’ growth cases:  
Angola’s economic growth has been driven by the augmentation of oil prices and strong 
increases in domestic demand. Although it has implemented reforms (including fiscal and 
monetary tightening, enhancing the exchange rate system, public finance management, banking 
reforms), Angola’s economy has remained highly dependent on oil revenues (African Economic 
Outlook, 2013). In Nigeria over the past decade, economic growth has been robust. However, 
this has again been driven by the oil sector and domestic demand (telecommunications, 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurant services) (African Economic 
Outlook, 2013). Rwanda’s growth has been strong and boosted by good harvests, rising export 
receipts and expansion in credit to the private sector. The rise in commodity prices, expansion in 
the agriculture, mining, and construction sectors, and high domestic demand sustained by the 
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expansion of credit in the private sector contributed to Rwanda’s economic growth (African 
Economic Outlook, 2013). 
Ghana has made considerable progress by maintaining stable macro-economic policies. Ghana’s 
growth has been stimulated by oil revenues, mining sector and robust export performance of 
cocoa and gold (African Economic Outlook, 2013). Lesotho’s economy has recovered from the 
global economic crisis and the effect of floods in the early 2011. Lesotho’s economic growth has 
remained moderate stimulate by good performance of the mining sector and construction sector. 
Lesotho’s government has undertaken reforms which include improving public financial 
management, reduction of public debts and building sufficient levels of international reserves 
(African Economic Outlook, 2013). Botswana has succeeded in maintaining stable 
macroeconomic policies, good governance, good management of diamond resources and well-
functioning institutions. Botswana’s growth has been stimulated by the mining, construction, and 
manufacturing sectors. 
Figure 4.3: Some sub-Saharan Africa countries compared to other countries in terms of GDP per 
capita (current US dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
Figure 4.3 shows a comparison between some African countries with other developing countries. 
Some African countries have been growing relatively fast compared to other developing 
countries from 2000 to 2011 (for instance, Angola, Republic of Congo, Botswana, Nigeria, 
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Rwanda and South Africa). Despite this, GDP per capita remains very low compared to 
countries such as Brazil, Chile, Malaysia and Republic of Korea (see also Appendix 3).  
Figure 4.4: Sub-Saharan African region compared with other regions in terms of gross capital 
formation (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
Figure 4.4 shows that from 1990 to 2010, sub-Saharan Africa’s gross capital formation increased 
slightly. Historically low, sub-Saharan Africa’s gross capital formation seems to have improved 
and caught up with Latin America and Caribbean and rich countries. This can be probably 
explained by the augmentation of capital spending in natural resources and other sectors (e.g. 
infrastructures sector). Despite this, SSA is still far behind compared to East Asia and Pacific and 
South Asia. 
Figure 4.5:  Sub-Saharan African region compared with other regions in terms of gross savings 
(% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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Figure 4.6:  Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of gross capital formation and gross savings (% of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
Figure 4.5 above shows that from 1980 to 1995 sub-Saharan Africa’s gross savings decreased 
from 18.35% to 14.93%. Although, it recovered slightly, from 1995 to 2010, sub-Saharan Africa’s 
gross savings remains low in comparative perspective. The patterns indicated by Figures 4.4 and 
4.5 suggest that South Asia is experiencing an ‘investment transition’, whereas sub-Saharan 
Africa is not. This impression is reinforced by Figure 4.6. Although, investment has recently 
picked up in sub-Saharan Africa, there is no sign yet of savings following suit. Sub-Saharan 
African gross capital formation remains dependent on external funds (African Economic 
Outlook, 2013).  
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Figure 4.7: Agriculture value added (% of GDP) by regions including sub-Saharan Africa 
 
a) Value added (% of GDP)                        b) Value added per worker (constant 2000 US $)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Index of (b): 1995=1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
Figure 4.7a clearly shows that sub-Saharan Africa agriculture sector has a declining contribution 
to GDP after about 2000. This is not unexpected as a relative decline in agriculture is an 
anticipated part of economic modernisation. However, given the critical role for agriculture 
identified in Chapter 2, the speed of the decline, and the absence of other indicators of structural 
change raise concern (see also Appendix 6).  Figures 4.7b and 4.7c reinforce this picture. Value 
added per worker is dramatically lower in SSA than in all other regions. Furthermore, unlike 
other regions, value added per worker has been virtually stagnant in sub-Saharan Africa, and was 
no higher in the late 2000s than it was in the mid-1980s. This suggests that sub-Saharan African 
agriculture is still facing major obstacles which undermine it development. 
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Figure 4.8:  Industry value added (% of GDP) by regions including sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Manufactures exports as a share of GDP by regions including sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
Figure 4.8 shows that, from 1990 to 2005 sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) industry sector as a share 
of GDP significantly improved, after decreasing from 1980 to 1992. 
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Figure 4.9 above shows that although industry has increased its share of GDP in SSA (see also 
Appendices 5 and 15); manufactures exports have continued to decline as a share of GDP. All 
regions, including South Asia now exceed sub-Saharan Africa in this regard. Although the data is 
sporadic, this indicates that an improvement in industry sector as share of GDP could be 
probably explained by an increase in the extractive sector. This shows that sub-Saharan Africa’s 
industrial sector has not moved away from the primary sector and reinforced the argument that 
sub-Saharan Africa has not begun to go through an ‘investment transition’ process. Figure 4.10 
below shows that the sub-Saharan Africa region’s exports have been higher than all other 
regions, except the Euro region. However, the improvement in sub-Saharan Africa’s export 
sector can be probably explained by an increase in raw materials and has been helped favourably 
by the increase of commodity prices (see also Appendix 7). This demonstrates that sub-Saharan 
Africa’s export sector continues to be dominated and dependent on natural resource exports 
(e.g. oil). 
 
Figure 4.10: Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) by regions including sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
The impression that growth has been dominated by primary exports and consumption, and has 
not reflected an ‘investment transition’ is reinforced by considering individual country cases. 
Only four countries are discussed here to avoid clutter. For other countries, see Appendix 17. 
Figures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 present the sectoral structures of selected African countries. 
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Figure 4.11: Sectoral composition: Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
Figure 4.11 above shows that Nigerian’s exports (EXP) have significantly improved. The good 
performance observed in exports can be probably attributed to the rise in oil price (African 
Economic Outlook, 2013). The services sector (SERV) seemed to be improved. This might be 
driven by telecommunication, construction, hotel and restaurant and business services (African 
Economic Outlook, 2013). However, manufactured exports as a share of GDP 
(MANEXP/GDP) and manufacturing value added (MANU) have been low as a contribution to 
GDP. Manufacturing only represented 2.2 % of GDP, mainly in cement and oil refining 
activities in 2011 (African Economic Outlook, 2013). Although, the data are sporadic or missing, 
this indicates that Nigeria has not experienced structural transformation. 
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Figure 4.12: Sectoral composition: Rwanda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
Figure 4.12 above shows Rwanda’s services sector (SERV) has largely contributed to GDP. The 
expansion in the services sector has been driven by trade, transport and telecommunications and 
augmentation in finance and insurance (African Economic Outlook, 2013). It observed that 
Rwanda’s export sector (EXP) improved as a share of GDP. The export earnings have been 
stimulated by stable and rising prices of main exports products such as coffee, tea and minerals, 
which together accounted for 74.8% of export earnings in 2011. In addition, the recovery in 
tourism contributed to higher export earnings. However, although gross capital formation (GCF) 
has slightly improved, gross domestic savings (GDS) has shown a negative trend. Similarly, 
manufacturing value added (MANU) and manufactures exports as a share of GDP 
(MANUEXP/GDP) have contributed very little to GDP. This gives the impression that the 
secondary sector is not yet developed and Rwanda is very vulnerable to outside shocks. Savings 
and investments are too low to generate a sustained ‘investment transition’. 
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Figure 4.13: Sectoral composition: Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
Figure 4.13 above shows that Ghana’s export sector (EXP) started to recover from 2007 to 
2010. This might be explained by the good performance of mining and quarrying, which includes 
petroleum, and which increased by 225.4% in 2011. The services sector (SERV) has improved. 
This might be driven by the construction sector and the high domestic demand of public and 
private consumption (African Economic Outlook, 2013). However, manufactured exports 
(MANEXP/GDP) and manufacturing value added (MANU) both remain small as a share of 
GDP. Once again, the same pattern of savings falling to increase casts doubt on whether the 
increase in investment (GCF) constitutes a sustained ‘investment transition’. 
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Figure 4.14: Sectoral composition: Republic of Congo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
Figure 4.14 shows the Republic of Congo’s exports sector (EXP) has a large contribution to 
GDP. In the Republic of Congo, the good performance experienced in the export sector has 
been probably driven by an augmentation in the international oil prices. However, the oil sector 
remains the largest contributor with 67% to GDP and 89% of exports (African Economic 
Outlook, 2013). Gross domestic savings fluctuated between 1980 and 2010. Gross capital 
formation (GCF) has shown a negative trend. Manufacturing value added (MANU) and 
manufacture exports as a share of GDP (MANUEXP/GDP) have contributed less to GDP. 
Once again, this reinforces the impression that secondary sector remains underdeveloped and 
that the Republic of Congo is highly dependent on external factors. Savings and investment are 
too low to generate a sustained ‘investment transition’.  
In summary, the sub-Saharan Africa region as a whole has experienced growth acceleration.  
However, sub-Saharan Africa remains highly dependent on the primary and tertiary sectors. 
Furthermore, and unlike in other developing regions, there is no sign of ‘investment transitions’ 
occurring. The worry remains that the growth acceleration is not leading to structural change or 
sustainable development. 
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4.2.2 Human development indicators 
 
Theory and evidence have shown that growth is not the same thing as ‘development’ and 
economic growth by itself is unlikely to be sufficient to generate genuine development, 
particularly in terms of human development. It is important for us to look at how SSA has 
performed compare with other regions in terms of human development and social indicators. 
Data on the Human Development Index (HDI) have been presented in two different tables 
because they come from two different UNDP reports and it is not possible to reconcile them. As 
discussed in section 4.2, it seems that all the years in the reports have been re-based without 
explanation and it is very difficult to assess their validity. Despite these data limitations, it is clear 
that sub-Saharan African countries human development indices remain very low compared to 
other regions and countries. 
 
Table 4.1a: Human development index of some sub-Saharan Africa countries and some other 
countries 
 Source: UNDP report 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Botswana 0.579 0.682 0665 0632 0673 0.683 0.694 
Burkina Faso 0.264 0.285 0.297 0.319 0.367 0.384 0.389 
Burundi 0.292 0.327 0.299 0.358 0.375 0.387 0.394 
Cameroon 0.498 0.485 0.457 0.513 0.520 0.519 0.523 
Brazil 0.694 0.710 0.734 0.790 0.805 0.808 0.813 
Republic of Congo … 0.597 0.575 0.536 0.600 0.603 0.601 
Côte d’Ivoire … 0.463 0.456 0.481 0.480 0.482 0.484 
Malawi 0.379 0.390 0.453 0.478 0.476 0.484 0.493 
Mali  0.239 0.254 0.267 0.316 0.361 0.366 0.371 
Chile 0.762 0.795 0.822 0.849 0.872 0.874 0.878 
Mozambique 0.258 0.273 0.310 0.350 0.390 0.397 0.402 
China 0.556 0.608 0.657 0.719 0.756 0.763 0.772 
Nigeria …. 0.438 0.450 0.466 0.499 0.506 0.511 
Rwanda 0.361 0.325 0.306 0.402 0.449 0.455 0.460 
Malaysia 0.689 0.737 0.767 0.797 0.821 0.825 0.829 
South Africa 0.680 0.698 … 0.688 0.678 0.680 0.683 
India 0.453 0.489 0.511 0.556 0.596 0.604 0.612 
Zambia … 0.495 0.454 0.431 0.466 0.473 0.481 
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Table 4.1b: Human development index of some sub-Saharan Africa countries and some other 
countries 
 Source: UNDP report 2011 
 
Table 4.1a above shows that, from 1995 to 2007 countries such as Nigeria, Burundi, Republic of 
Congo, Mali, Mozambique, Burkina Faso and Rwanda have shown some improvement which 
did not reflect the fast economic growth achieved by these countries (UNDP report 2009). Table 
4.1b shows that from 2009 to 2011 the human development indexes for countries such as 
Nigeria, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Mali, Mozambique, Burkina Faso and Rwanda, have also 
experienced slight improvement (UNDP report 2011). Between 1990 and 2007, Nigeria, Rwanda 
and Burundi’s human development indices have improved respectively from 0.438, 0.325 and 
0.327 to 0.511, 0.460 and 0394 between 1990 and 2007(see Table 4.1a). Let us illustrate some of 
the efforts which have been undertaken by countries such as Nigeria, Rwanda and Burundi to 
improve their human development indicators. 
The good performance in Nigerian human development has been partly caused by the 
implementation of reforms in the education and health sectors, particularly with the introduction 
of Universal Basic Education programmes. Budget spending in education increased from 4% in 
2010 to 6% in 2011. The Nigerian government has improved the health care system. Budget 
spending on health increased from 4% in 2010 to 6% in 2011. Nigerian government adopted 
several policies; in order to improve the health system, including a National Strategic Health 
Development (HSHD) (African Economic Outlook, 2013). 
 2009 2010 2011 
Botswana 0.626 0.631 0.633 
Burkina Faso 0.326 0.329 0.331 
Burundi 0.308 0.313 0.316 
Cameroon 0.475 0.479 0.482 
Brazil 0.708 0.715 0.718 
Republic of Congo 0.523 0.528 0.533 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.397 0.401 0.400 
Malawi 0.387 0.395 0.400 
Mali  0.352 0.356 0.359 
Chile 0.798 0.802 0.805 
Mozambique 0.312 0.317 0.322 
China 0.674 0.682 0.687 
Nigeria 0.449 0.454 0.459 
Rwanda 0.419 0.425 0.429 
Malaysia 0.752 0.758 0.761 
South Africa 0.610 0.615 0.619 
India 0.535 0.542 0.547 
Zambia 0.419 0.425 0.430 
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The Rwandan government has prioritised health sector by increasing public expenditure on 
health (including donor support) from 10.2% between 2009 and 2010 to 16% between 2010 and 
2011. This has resulted in several improvements in health-sector such as reduction in infant 
mortality rate, reduction in under-five mortality rate and decrease in maternal mortality). The 
introduction of Community-Based Health Insurance (CHBI) programmes has significantly 
contributed to increased access to health services. In the education sector, an improvement in 
school completion rates and education quality has been observed. The Rwandan government has 
implemented a free nine-year basic education programme which increased the gross enrolment 
rate for secondary education from 20.7% in 2008 to 31.5% in 2010. It also provides scholarship 
to eligible student for tertiary education and loans to poor students who do not qualify for 
government scholarships (African Economic Outlook, 2013). 
Burundi has achieved positive results in terms of education and health. The Burundian 
government offered free primary education and health provision for pregnant women and 
children under five, and public expenditure rose for these two sectors. For example, in primary 
education, enrolment increased from 81.6% in 2005 to 130% in 2010. The numbers at secondary 
level increased to 80% due to the rapid expansion of community colleges. The number of 
students at the tertiary level has doubled, caused by the augmentation of private education 
(African Economic Outlook, 2013). In the health care system, building and equipping new 
centres, training, decentralisation of services toward the creation of health districts, free 
provision of certain drugs and medical care for pregnant women and children under five, have 
resulted in significant improvement in terms of accessibility and quality of services. For example, 
infant mortality fell from 114 to 101 per 1,000 live births and neonatal mortality fell considerably 
from 21.3 to 7.2 per 1,000 live births (African Economic Outlook, 2013). However, in 
comparison with other countries such as Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, China and India, African 
countries human development continues to perform badly. For instance, from 1985 to 2007, 
South Africa’s HDI barely improved and it remains behind compared to Brazil’s HDI, which 
improved significantly (see Table 4.1a). 
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Table 4.2: Sub-Saharan Africa region compared to other regions in terms of human development 
index 
Source: UNDP report 2011. 
Table 4.2 above presents data on sub-Saharan Africa region in comparison with other regions in 
terms of human development index. From 1990 to 2011, the sub-Saharan Africa region HDI 
improved from 0.383 to 0.463. In comparison, the HDI in East Asia and Pacific (EAP) and 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) showed a significant improvement respectively from 0.498 
and 0.624 to 0.671 and 0.731 between 1990 and 2011 (see UNDP report 2011). South Asia over 
took sub-Saharan Africa in terms of HDI from 1980 to 2011.  
The improvement of quality of life in sub-Saharan Africa remains a daily struggle. Sub-Saharan 
Africa has experienced a small improvement in HDI but continues to remain behind compared 
with other regions. The improvement observed in sub-Saharan Africa’s human development 
seems to come from all dimensions of human development. For example, some countries have 
introduced the universal access to primary education at various times (e.g. Uganda, Nigeria, and 
Lesotho). Life expectancy has improved because of new programmes or policies which aim to 
improve access to healthcare services and the quality of the services provided (e.g. Rwanda) 
(African Economic Outlook, 2013). To some extent, sub-Saharan Africa’s growth has allowed 
for the channelling of resources to social activities which contributes to improving people’s daily 
lives (e.g. spending on education and healthcare) and other funds through new investments 
(African Economic Outlook, 2013). It has been estimated that a one percentage increase in 
income per capita led to about a one and half per cent reduction in poverty (Fosu, 2011 cited in 
African Economic Outlook, 2013). The following tables present other social indicators which are 
used individually to evaluate sub-Saharan African growth sustainability in terms of life 
expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, primary school enrolment and tertiary school 
enrolment. For more variables on other social indicators see the Appendices. 
 
 1980   1990 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
0.428 0.498 0.581 0.622 0.658 0.666 0.671 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
0.582 0.624 0.680 0.703 0.722 0.728 0.731 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
0.644 0.680 0.695 0.728 0.744 0.748 0.751 
South Asia 0.356 0.418 0.468 0.510 0.538 0.545 0.548 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
0.365 0.383 0.401 0.431 0.456 0.460 0.463 
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Table 4.3: Sub-Saharan Africa region compared to other regions in terms of life expectancy at 
births, total (years) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
Table 4.3 above shows that from 1985 to 2000, sub-Saharan Africa region’s life expectancy 
stagnated and only increased slightly from 2005 to 2010. In all other regions, life expectancy 
significantly improved from 1980 to 2010. This shows that sub-Saharan Africa remains with an 
inferior life expectancy compared to other regions (see also Appendix 4). 
Table 4.4: Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions in terms of mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
Table 4.4 above indicates that from 1980 to 2010, infant mortality rates significantly decreased in 
all regions. Despite this, sub-Saharan Africa’s infant mortality rate is still dramatically higher than 
other regions (see also Appendix 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
66.92 68.43 69.62 70.63 71.66 72.78 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
65.69 67.53 69.29 70.99 72.39 73.63 
OECD 
members 
73.07 74.21 75.26 76.54 77.75 78.92 
Euro area 74.45 75.65 76.65 77.83 79.04 80.32 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 48.78 49.48 49.39 49.44 50.77 53.16 
South Asia 56.43 57.94 59.42 61.15 62.94 64.62 
 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
46.49 41.51 37.86 32.42 25.36 19.23 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
54.54 45.16 37.9 30.82 24.18 18.78 
OECD 
members 
23.7 18.97 15.26 11.73 9.2 7.35 
Euro area 11.56 8.99 6.91 5.31 4.4 3.74 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
112.17 107.68 104.47 97.31 86.69 75.57 
South Asia 99.82 88.72 79.3 69.6 60.51 48.3 
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Table 4.5: Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions in terms of school enrolments, primary 
(% gross) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
Table 4.5 above shows that from 1985 to 2010 sub-Saharan Africa region primary school 
enrolment substantially improved, but remains low compared with other regions (see also 
Appendix 4). Table 4.6 suggests that sub-Saharan Africa lags even further behind in tertiary 
education. 
Table 4.6: Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions in terms of school enrolments, tertiary 
(% gross) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
In summary, sub-Saharan African countries’ human development index and other social 
indicators have shown some improvement, but do not reflect the fast economic growth 
experienced by sub-Saharan African countries. In the following section, 4.3, econometric analysis 
will be conducted, in an attempt to investigate our hypotheses. 
4.3   Econometric methodology  
The study used data from 77 countries for which GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) was 
available for every year from 1960 to 2011. The findings are tentative for two reasons. Firstly, the 
data problems with the World Development Indicators (WDI) database are severe. As discussed 
 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
111.33 121.34 113.59 110.67 110.32 109.22 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
116.62 114.81 114.77 119.44 118.30 115.71 
OECD 
members 
104.20 104.71 103.62 103.70 102.91 104.80 
Euro area 103.75 104.50 102.97 104.14 104.48 105.57 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
78.81 72.34 73.73 77.38 88.92 98.54 
South Asia 79.7 83.28 88.32 88.72 97.78 107.14 
 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
6.38 7.18 8.52 13.48 20.51 26.46 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
14.6 16.75 17.23 20.34 27.64 37.44 
OECD 
members 
32.52 36.08 43.4 49.52 56.9 63.53 
Euro area 27.08 30.28 39.47 49.04 55.5 59.5 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
2.12 2.7 3.38 3.95 5.2 6.28 
South Asia 5.1 5.31 5.19 6.66 8.99 12.77 
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in section 4.2, there is the problem of missing data. Baltagi and Heun Song (2006: 495) argued 
that in collecting data on a set of countries, states or firms over time, it is possible to find that 
some countries started recording the data later than others or some countries stopped recording 
the data all together. Firms may have gone out of the market, while new entrants firms may have 
emerged over the sample period observed. In the same way, this can also occur while using 
labour or consumer on households, and find out that some households moved or can no longer 
be included in the panel. These implications lead to “unbalanced or incomplete” panel. With a 
balanced panel, the individuals are observed in the entire time sample period for all cross-section 
units. Otherwise it is an unbalanced panel. The panel data are expected to be incomplete or 
unbalanced because of randomly missing observations. However, unbalanced or incomplete 
panel seems to be the norm in typical economic empirical settings (Baltagi, 2001: 159; Baltagi and 
Heun Song, 2006: 494-495). Secondly, this analysis is only intended to be indicative. The panel 
data technique seems to be the more appropriate research method for this study. Panel data is 
defined as data sets on the same set of countries over several periods of time. It is also use to 
explain the pooling of time series observations across a range of cross-sectional units, such as 
countries, regions, states, firms and households (Baltagi and Heun Song, 2006: 494). Several 
studies gave a number of advantages of using panel data, which allows for control for individual 
heterogeneity, provides more information about the data, and gives more variability and less 
collinearity among the variables(Baltagi, 2001: 5-7).  
4.3.1 Model specification 
Our panel data technique investigates three questions:  
1. Is sub-Saharan Africa still different and if so, is it converging? 
2. Does growth cause human development improvement? 
3. Does human development improvement cause growth? 
 
A. ‘Is sub-Saharan Africa still different?’ 
The following three models were used to explore whether sub-Saharan Africa is different. The 
null hypothesis suggests: (H0: β1 = 0); if the null hypothesis is rejected, sub-Saharan Africa is 
‘different’. 
Yit = β0 + β1DSSA1it + β2Vit + uit       (4.1) 
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Where: Yit  is the endogenous variable representing economic performance (measured by the 
level and growth of gross domestic product per capita at constant 2000 US$); β0 denotes the 
intercept coefficient; DSSA1it  represents a sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable compared to two 
other developing regions namely Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) and East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP); Vit is the list of control variables (which control variables are used and discussed for each 
case in the results section 4.4); uit is the stochastic error term.  
Xit = β0 + β1DSSA1it + β2Vit + uit       (4.2) 
Where: Xit  is the endogenous variable representing human development (proxied by indicators 
of health and education as discussed in section 4.2; β0  denotes the intercept coefficient; DSSA1it 
represents a sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable; Vit represents the list of control variables 
(which control variables are used and discussed for each case in the results section 4.4); uit is the 
stochastic error term.  
Zit = β0 + β1DSSA1it + β2Vit  + uit       (4.3) 
Where: Zit is the endogenous variable referring to economic structure and economic 
infrastructure; β0 denotes the intercept coefficient; DSSA1it represents a sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy variable; Vit represents the list of control variables; ut is the stochastic error term.  
B. For ‘interaction’: is SSA diverging or converging? 
The following multiple regression equations explore whether sub-Saharan Africa is diverging or 
converging with other regions. The null hypothesis is that SSA is neither converging with nor 
diverging from other regions (H0: β4 = 0). 
Yit = β0 + β1DSSA1it+ β2Vit + β3DTit + β4DSSA1*DTit + uit    (4.4) 
Xit = β0 + β1DSSA1it+ β2Vit + β3DTit + β4DSSA1*DTit + uit    (4.5) 
Zit = β0 + β1DSSA1it+ β2Vit + β3DTit + β4DSSA1*DTit + uit    (4.6) 
 (4.4-4.6) is similar to (4.1-4.3) respectively, except that they include the term DTit and 
DSSA*DTit where:  
DTit represents a period dummy; DSSA1*DTit denotes the ‘interaction’ between sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy variable and period dummy. 
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C. Causal relationship between economic growth and human development 
This is a brief tentative section to explore the two ‘chains’ discussed by Ranis et al. (1997). In 
order to do that, the following multiple regression equations explore whether economic growth 
leads to human development or vice versa. 
1. Chain A: Human development leads to growth. 
 
Yit = β0 + β1Xit   + β2Vit  + uit        (4.7) 
Where: Yit  is the endogenous variable refers to economic growth (of gross domestic product per 
capita at constant 2000 US$); β0 denotes the intercept coefficient; Xit  is the exogenous variable 
representing human development (proxied by indicators of health and education as discussed in 
section 4.2); Vit is the list of control variables; uit is the stochastic error term. 
2. Chain B: Growth leads to human development. 
 
Xit = β0  + β1Yit  + β2Vit  + uit        (4.8) 
Where: Xit is the endogenous variable refers to human development; β0 denotes the intercept 
coefficient; Yit denotes the exogenous variable of economic growth (of gross domestic product 
per capita at constant 2000 US$); Vit is the list of control variables; uit is the stochastic error term. 
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4.4   Results 
4.4.1 Economic growth 
Table 4.7: Dependent variable: GROW (Growth) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
 
Equation (2) in Table 4.7 suggests that SSA’s growth was significantly lower than LAC and EAP 
in the 1980-1994 period. The interaction dummy is statistically significant. This implies that the 
SSA growth acceleration after 1994 resulted in some convergence with LAC and EAP. However, 
equation (1) suggests that there is no convergence within the post-1995 period. The _05_11R 
dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that after 2004 all the regions experienced 
significantly higher growth. 
  
variable 1 2 
   
C 0.017601 (5.563206)* 
0.022179 
(11.08470)* 
SSA1 -0.00388 (-0.883674) 
-0.019558 
(-7.038430)* 
_05_11R 0.014377 (3.117267)*  
SSA1*_05_11R -0.00398 (-0.621354)  
_95_11  
0.002187 
(0.631061) 
SSA1*_95_11  
0.013802 
(2.867815)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 918 2754 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01655 0.022644 
S.E. of regression 0.048397 0.059491 
Sum squared resid 2.140797 9.732656 
F-statistic 6.143875 22.26061 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000389 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.967637 1.863648  
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4.4.2 Human development 
Table 4.8: Dependent variable: LIFEEX (Life expectancy at birth, total years) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
Table 4.8 above shows the results of regressions run on life expectancy. Life expectancy is an 
indicator of human development (particularly health issues). The table shows that sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy (SSA1) is statistically significant and negative in all equations, including that this 
result is robust. Equations (1) and (2) control for the level of per-capita GDP (as a rough proxy 
for ‘economic development’) and for public health expenditure as a share of GDP (Health_pu). 
The results suggest that life expectancy is approximately 10 years less than other developing 
countries. Equations (3) and (4) show two different period dummies. Equation (3) models 
convergence within the post-1994 period. It suggests that life expectancy in SSA has significantly 
converged (with life expectancy in LAC and EAP) within the 1995-2011 period. In other words 
life expectancy in SSA was (0.99) + (1.33) = 2.32 years higher in the 2005-2011 period than in 
1995-2004 period. This increase was significantly larger than the increase than in LAC and EAP 
(1.35 years). Equation (4) test compares 1995-2011 with the earlier period (1960-1994). The 
interaction dummy tells us that life expectancy in SSA has significantly diverged at 1%. This 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C 30.38835 (29.37131)* 
42.45864 
(32.01037)* 
43.04422 
(33.79962)* 
32.67906 
(35.14686)* 
SSA1 -9.265157 (-30.24380)* 
-12.705661 
(-30.33608)* 
-13.37641 
(-27.62762)* 
-9.285198 
(-30.70220)* 
Log(GDP) 4.657702 (33.87052)* 
3.637336 
(21.11106)* 
3.554603 
(22.04260)* 
4.030665 
(32.03887)* 
Health_pu  0.169243 (1.412569) 
  
_05_11r   1.358466 (3.281655)* 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   0.994954    (1.734494)*** 
 
_95_11    7.286070 (22.10302)* 
SSA1*_95_11    -2.773030 (-6.117124)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 2763 855 905 2763 
Adjusted R-squared 0.673256 0.841921 0.847470 0.738676 
S.E. of regression 6.193174 4.388266 4.303246 5.538584 
Sum squared resid 105860.9 16387.61 16666.13 84604.17 
F-statistic 2846.550 1517.117 1256.678 1952.818 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.389253 1.672419 1.770152 1.615571 
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shows us that the gap between life expectancy has decreased in SSA and other developing 
regions increased by (-2.77) + (7.28) = 4.51 in 1995-2011 compared to the 1960-1994 period. 
Table 4.9: Dependent variable IMORT (Mortality rate, infant per 1,000 live births) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
Table 4.9 shows the results of regressions run on the infant mortality rate. Infant mortality rate is 
taken as an indicator of human development. Once again, SSA dummies are statically significant 
in all equations. It observes that infant mortality rate in SSA is significantly higher than in other 
developing countries. Equation (1) controls for the level of per-capita GDP and equation (2) 
controls for the level of public expenditure on health which are statistically significant at 1%. 
Equations (3) and (4) indicate that both periodisations demonstrate some convergence, albeit the 
coefficient on the interaction term SSA*95_11 is significant only at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C 217.5847 (42.95441)* 
156.3538 
(37.55713)* 
154.4435 
(38.21810)* 
207.9987 
(46.63400)* 
SSA1 20.14940 (13.34056)* 
26.55853 
(20.11681)* 
31.28884 
(20.12994)* 
25.17532 
(17.04290)* 
Log(GDP) -22.48049 (-33.54680)* 
-15.70366 
(-28.88033)* 
-16.52579 
(-32.37040)* 
-19.86364 
(-33.09320)* 
Health_pu  -3.251408 (-8.391269)* 
  
_05_11r   -3.966781 (-2.909414)* 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   -8.812367 (-4.668900)* 
 
_95_11    -29.37333 (-18.38065)* 
SSA1*_95_11    -3.753424 (-1.712065)*** 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 2713 861 918 2713 
Adjusted R-squared 0.532618 0.835480 0.836125 0.640248 
S.E. of regression 30.54316 14.22761 14.26033 26.79658 
Sum squared resid 2528117. 173478.1 185664.9 1944498. 
F-statistic 1546.268 1456.779 1170.678 1207.634 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.262797 1.768711 1.944936 1.593535 
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Table 4.10: Dependent variable: PRENROL (School enrolment, Primary % gross) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
Table 4.10 shows the regression run on primary school enrolment. Equation (1) controls for the 
level of per-capita GDP which is statically significant at 1%. This shows that GDP has 
contributed to improve the primary school enrolment by 11.48. Equation (2) controls for the 
level of public expenditure on education which is positive and statistically significant. The SSA 
dummy is statistically significant. This suggests that sub-Saharan African primary school 
enrolment is significantly low and far behind compared to other developing countries. In 
equations (3) and (4), the interaction dummies tell us that primary school enrolments have 
significantly converged. In equation (3), primary school enrolment has increased by (15.17) + 
(0.30) = 15.47 comparing the 2005-2011 period to the 1995-2004 period. In equation (4) primary 
school enrolment increased by (20.15) + (0.72) = 20.87 comparing the 1995-2011 period to the 
1960-1994 period. This simply means that, although primary school enrolment has significantly 
improved in SSA, the gap remains big compared to other developing countries. 
 
 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C 18.88780 (4.011835)* 
77.76171 
(12.41327)* 
63.02221 
(9.690858)* 
19.91034 
(4.433870)* 
SSA1 -5.935302 (-4.240867)* 
-12.20111 
(-5.897461)* 
-10.22781 
(-4.263825)* 
-13.90063 
(-9.137448)* 
Log(GDP) 11.48273 (18.64544)* 
2.916814 
(3.426538)* 
5.865314 
(7.129638)* 
11.31028 
(18.99296)* 
Ed_pu  1.920807 (4.781517)* 
  
_05_11r   0.305204 (0.143327) 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   15.17912 (5.122049)* 
 
_95_11    0.727220 (0.469951) 
SSA1*_95_11    20.15635 (9.418296)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 1951 824 746 1951 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283987 0.166594 0.191686 0.349642 
S.E. of regression 23.94163 20.69792 20.13111 22.81758 
Sum squared resid 1116597. 351291.2 300298.7 1013169. 
F-statistic 387.7077 55.83779 45.16789 263.0876 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.755336 1.332312 1.957968 1.864596 
 67 
 
Table 4.11: Dependent variable: TERTENROL (School enrolment, Tertiary % gross) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
Table 4.11 above shows the regressions run on tertiary school enrolment. Tertiary enrolment is 
taken as an indicator of human development. Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) have controlled for 
the level of per-capita GDP which has been positive and statistically significant at 1%. In 
addition equations (2), (3) and (4) have controlled for the level of public expenditure on 
education which has been negative and statistically significant at 1%. In equations (1), (2), and (4) 
the SSA dummies are statistically significant at 1% and in equation (3) at 5%. This suggests that 
tertiary enrolment is significantly lower in SSA than in other developing region. In equations (3) 
and (4), the interaction dummies suggest that tertiary enrolment has significantly diverged for 
both periods used. This confirms the pattern observed in Table 4.6. Other developing regions 
have increased tertiary enrolment but SSA has largely failed to do so. 
 
 
 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C -33.32925 (-13.01218)* 
-48.35401 
(-11.69568)* 
-48.35461 
(-8.970695)* 
-28.82582 
(-13.01665)* 
SSA1 -5.303942 (-6.864652)* 
-3.583611 
(-2.610472)* 
-4.282144 
(-2.224788)** 
-2.855168 
(-4.026145)* 
Log(GDP) 6.944576 (20.73852)* 
9.521909 
(17.10121)* 
9.550348 
(13.91864)* 
5.605513 
(18.99751)* 
Ed_pu  -0.340890 (-1.381407) 
  
_05_11r   8.052847 (5.708928)* 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   -6.062188 (-2.927215)* 
 
_95_11    15.06985 (21.97260)* 
SSA1*_95_11    -12.09173 (-12.20697)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 1406 629 409 1406 
Adjusted R-squared 0.499780 0.588931 0.655228 0.631431 
S.E. of regression 10.08507 10.79401 11.27831 8.656807 
Sum squared resid 142697.3 72819.21 61692.09 104991.4 
F-statistic 702.8812 300.9077 233.3326 602.7605 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.360288 1.771063 1.739771 1.429231 
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4.4.3 Economic infrastructure 
Table 4.12: Dependent variable: TELE (Telephone lines, per 100 people) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
Table 4.12 above shows the results of regressions run on telephone services (telephone lines, per 
100 people), which is taken as an indicator of infrastructure. In equations (1) and (2), the SSA 
dummy does not yield the expected sign and is even not statistically significant in (2). A simple 
regression (not shown) yields a negative and statistically significant relationship (at the 1% 
confident level) between SSA1 and TELE. This instability indicates modelling problems in the 
form of multicolinearity between the SSA dummy and GDP. Essentially, it is impossible to 
determine statistically whether TELE in sub-Saharan Africa is ‘caused’ by ‘GDP’ or ‘SSA1’. 
Equations (3) and (4) suggest significant divergence. 
 
 
 
 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C -27.19417 (-25.61217)* 
-27.59827 
(-25.05594)* 
-32.58269 
(-18.88223)* 
-26.82216 
(-29.07803)* 
SSA1 0.134709 (0.418834)* 
0.110255 
(0.332914) 
-0.296599 
(-0.447790) 
2.329029 
(7.056746)* 
Log(GDP) 4.699345 (33.97017)* 
4.761955 
(32.40370)* 
5.813806 
(26.66468)* 
4.183871 
(34.34451)* 
Invest  -0.001199 (-0.078669) 
  
_05_11r   2.211436 (3.810414)* 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   -2.835690 (-3.517998)* 
 
_95_11    8.000202 (25.49501)* 
SSA1*_95_11    -6.732842 (-15.46149)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 2047 1952 912 2047 
Adjusted R-squared 0.483347 0.482360 0.632089 0.610191 
S.E. of regression 5.601021 5.668602 6.070012 4.865123 
Sum squared resid 64123.22 62595.18 33418.45 48332.96 
F-statistic 958.0527 607.0089 392.2855 801.6804 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.818491 1.853790 1.995063 1.949496 
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4.4.4 Economic structure 
Table 4.13: Dependent variable: MANEXPGDP (Manufactures exports as a share of GDP) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
 
Table 4.13 above shows the results of regressions run on manufactured exports as a share of 
GDP. A similar pattern is revealed here as in the previous Table 4.12, with unstable estimators 
for SSA and some evidence of divergence. The only differences are that ‘Invest’ is statistically 
significant and the evidence for divergence is weak (reflected in only one of the specifications).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C -18.97536 (-8.337486)* 
-20.86159 
(-9.024486)* 
-11.90340 
(-2.461919)* 
-15.46465 
(-7.193647)* 
SSA1 -0.193068 (-0.294404) 
0.092694 
(0.137958) 
-4.409280 
(-2.473282)* 
0.500026 
(0.701814) 
Log(GDP) 3.837741 (12.83692)* 
3.250608 
(10.30448)* 
3.652266 
(5.962106)* 
2.878409 
(10.01301)* 
Invest  0.284723 (8.022462)* 
  
_05_11r   0.757896 (0.512420) 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   0.804281 (0.364561) 
 
_95_11    9.975065 (15.05998)* 
SSA1*_95_11    -5.816373 (-5.857078)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 1925 1839 748 1925 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125242 0.150963 0.135819 0.227631 
S.E. of regression 11.11064 11.11150 14.93171 10.44017 
Sum squared resid 237264.0 226559.2 165656.3 209274.5 
F-statistic 138.7327 109.9353 30.35054 142.7597 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.744357 1.765601 1.772088 1.902096 
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4.4.5 Causal relationship between Economic Growth (EG) and Human Development           
(HD) 
4.4.5.1 Does EG influence HD? 
Table 4.14: Regressions of GROWB4 (Growth before) on various dependent variables 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
Table 4.14 above shows regressions for ‘growb4’ on various indicators of human development. 
Growb4 is the four year ‘backward’ moving average of the growth rate of GDP per capita (in 
constant 2000 US$). For example, the value for 1995 is the moving average from 1992 to 1995.  
The other independent variables are included as controls. In equation (1) with the dependent 
variable as LIFEEX (life expectancy); growb4 is statistically significant at 1%. This indicates that 
growb4 has a positive effect on life expectancy. In equations (2), (3) and (4) with the dependent 
variables as FERT (fertility rate), IMORT (infant mortality) and PRENROL (primary education); 
growb4 has the expected effect and all are statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that 
growb4 has a positive impact on fertility rate, infant mortality and primary school. This supports 
the impression that growth can contribute to improve human development. 
 
 
 
variable LIFEEX FERT IMORT PRENROL 
C 52.55873 (98.11250)* 
5.101621 
(43.10781)* 
78.75944 
(31.27836)* 
90.69780 
(66.43706)* 
Growb4 67.81465 (7.383260)* 
-18.72276 
(-9.693132)* 
-342.6496 
(-8.332880)* 
72.93976 
(3.894892)* 
Health_pu 3.364370 (27.65811)* 
-0.442776 
(-20.47191)* 
-10.62753 
(-23.08660)* 
 
Ed_pu    1.760215 (6.556367)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 1207 766 768 1400 
Adjusted R-squared 0.402370 0.447731 0.482202 0.037663 
S.E. of regression 9.176020 1.169098 24.89478 18.66696 
Sum squared resid 101376.0 1041.494 473489.0 486792.1 
F-statistic 406.9863 207.7313 239.0908 28.37606 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.838928 1.901990 2.212029 1.452776 
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4.4.5.2 Does HD influence EG? 
Table: 4.15: Dependent variable: GROWF4 (growth forward 4 years) 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
T-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1% 
**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at 10% 
Table 4.15 above shows the results of regressions run on the forward four years moving average 
of the growth rate of GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$). Savings is included as a control 
variable. In equation (1), LIFEEX (life expectancy) is positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests that life expectancy has a positive effect on the forward four years growth. Once again 
here, in equations (2), (3) and (4), FERT (fertility rate), IMORT (infant mortality) and 
PRENROL (primary school) reflect the expected effect and are all statistically significant at 1%. 
This suggests that improvements in the fertility rate, infant mortality and primary school have a 
positive impact on the forward four years’ growth. This reinforces the idea that human 
development has a robust influence on growth.  
4.5   Conclusion  
 
The chapter has empirically assessed recent sub-Saharan Africa growth and human development 
in comparative perspective. Firstly the chapter conducted a descriptive analysis using graphs and 
tables for the different variables mentioned. Secondly a quantitative analysis was performed 
using panel data analysis. This chapter attempted to establish whether sub-Saharan Africa’s 
recent economic growth reveals signs of sustainability. To assess whether SSA’s recent economic 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C -0.032946 (-10.44818)* 
0.015478 
(7.699123)* 
0.009031 
(5.571605)* 
-0.012852 
(-5.157489)* 
Lifeex 0.000518 (9.991666)*  
  
Fert  -0.003602 (-11.55571)* 
  
Imort   -0.000161 (-11.03981)* 
 
Prenrol    0.000104 (3.987770)* 
Saving 0.000795 (13.82837)* 
0.000736 
(12.65904)* 
0.000757 
(13.10988)* 
0.000933 
(15.18567)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 2378 2383 2390 2128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.159709 0.171034 0.166992 0.128979 
S.E. of regression 0.026247 0.026101 0.026208 0.026544 
Sum squared resid 1.636197 1.621458 1.639497 1.497235 
F-statistic 226.8905 246.7304 240.4590 158.4807 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.846368 1.870749 1.893119 1.999666 
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growth differed before the 1995, on one hand, the study has investigated economic structure and 
economic infrastructure. On the other hand, it has investigated human development. Finally, the 
limitations of using of statistical significance testing highlighted by Mbatha and Gustafsson 
(2013) are acknowledged 
 
In section 4.2, the descriptive analysis has suggested that SSA’s economic growth has 
significantly improved. However, economic structure has not significantly improved. Sub-
Saharan African economic structure continues to lag behind compared to other regions and 
continues to reflect a lack of structural transformation. This suggests that sub-Saharan Africa’s 
economic growth has been based on the primary sector (extractive sector) and the tertiary sector 
(services and commerce). This means that the secondary sector is not developed and quasi-non-
existent, as illustrated in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 (see also Appendices 5 and 15). Figures 4.4 and 4.5 
demonstrate that investments and particularly savings in sub-Saharan Africa are lower than in 
other countries. This reveals that sub-Saharan African has not yet achieved the ‘investment 
transition’ through a long-term process of capital accumulation based on a virtuous circle of 
rising savings, investments and exports. Human development has improved in sub-Saharan 
Africa as shown in the tables on human development index and other social indicators (such as 
life expectancy, fertility rate, primary school, secondary school and so forth). However, human 
development levels in sub-Saharan Africa remain far behind compared to other regions (e.g. 
EAP and LAC). All of these raise our concern about sub-Saharan Africa’s recent growth 
acceleration.  
 
In section 4.3, the results have shown that even though SSA has experienced growth 
acceleration, it is not catching up with other regions. Tables 4.7 to 4.13 indicate that in terms of 
human development, economic infrastructure and economic structure, sub-Saharan Africa did 
not significantly improve. The evidence of convergence is mixed. For human development, there 
were some signs of convergence for some variables but not for others (notably, tertiary 
education). Infrastructure and economic structure did not show significant signs of convergence 
before and after 1994 compared to other regions (EAP, South Asia and LAC). This reinforces 
the idea that sub-Saharan Africa has not yet experienced a qualitative human development and 
structural transformation. 
 
Finally, the study has attempted to investigate the causal relationship between economic growth 
and human development. The results reveal that economic growth does have a significant effect 
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on human development, and human development also has a significant effect on economic 
growth. Table 4.14 suggests that an increase in growth does have a positive effect on life 
expectancy, fertility rates, infant mortality, and primary school enrolment. Table 4.15 suggests 
that increased life expectancy positively influences growth. The same positive effect on growth 
augmentation applies for fertility rates, infant mortality rates and primary school enrolment.This 
reinforces the hypothesis used in Ranis et al. (1997) model. Overall, sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced improvements in human development, but its economic growth remains lower and 
is not significantly converging compared to other regions. Therefore, there is uncertainty as to 
whether sub-Saharan Africa’s recent growth is sustainable without a significant improvement in 
human development and transformation in economic structure and economic infrastructure. It is 
difficult to predict whether the recent accelerated growth sub-Saharan Africa will be sustainable 
and lead to development. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
The centre of interest in this study was sustainability. The paper attempted to analyse and 
evaluate the sustainability of economic growth and human development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
What drew our attention to conduct this study is the recent growth that sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced from 1995 up to now. 
Since the 1960s sub-Saharan African countries have been characterised by episodic growth paths. 
The question this raises is whether the recent growth accelerations will be any different.  
Underlying this question are the following questions. Has the recent growth experience been 
accompanied by broader ‘development’? What is the relationship between development (in 
particular human development) and growth? 
Chapter 2 set out two opposing views regarding how to achieve development, namely the ‘World 
Bank view’ and the ‘alternative view’. The essential claim of the ‘World Bank view’ is that 
globalisation and economic growth are sufficient to fight against poverty and stimulate 
development. The main idea is that economic growth will trickle-down automatically and lead to 
development. The ‘World Bank view’ was initially characterised by the strong market 
fundamentalism of the ‘Washington Consensus’. The ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ and 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the upsurge of Social Cash Transfers (SCTs) or 
social protection seem to be a shift towards direct poverty reduction. Despite this, social 
protection remains a passive instrument for poverty reduction and economic growth is still the 
primary channel of poverty reduction for the ‘World Bank view’.  
The ‘alternative view’ argues that economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to achieve 
development. Development requires more than economic growth. It requires structural 
transformation which implies a ‘qualitative’ change to a different socio-economic level. 
Furthermore, studies such as those by Ranis et al. (1997, 2000) argue that human development is 
an important component of this. High levels of human development can lead to high economic 
growth and high economic growth can promote a good human development or wellbeing, 
suggesting a virtuous cycle. Conversely, poor human development is implicated in a vicious 
cycle. Ranis et al. (1997:  21-22) make the strong claim that it is not possible to achieve sustained 
growth unless it is preceded by improvements in human development.  
This debate between the ‘World Bank view’ and the ‘alternative view’ has remained unresolved 
for several reasons, including deficiencies in the major datasets such as World Development 
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Indicators (2012). The key issue, however, is conceptual. There is no consensus on what 
development is and how poor countries should achieve it. Similarly, there is no consensus about 
why sub-Saharan development has lagged. Chapter 3 attempted to investigate the post-colonial 
period in sub-Saharan Africa in order to get some insight into this question. Most sub-Saharan 
African countries have been characterised by authoritarian regimes, centralisation of power, 
series of coups d’état, the ‘big men’ syndrome, and ethnic and regional fragmentation, which 
have destabilised their political and socio-economic development. African leaders have been 
more preoccupied with power than with responding to the general needs of the population and 
improving their living conditions.  
One interpretation of this is that sub-Saharan African countries ‘chose’ the wrong development 
model (heavy state involvement, import substitution, etc.). All that is necessary in this view is 
adherence to the ‘basic package’ (‘market friendly’ policy and ‘good governance’). It follows that 
the more ‘market friendly’ policies that became entrenched in the period of structural adjustment 
have played a major part in the post-1995 revival and that the revival is sustainable. The 
alternative view is that, some African leaders attempted to consolidate democracy and implement 
strategies of development, but they have been trapped in the fractionalised society. African 
leaders failed to overcome individual or group interests or to pursue the national interest. It 
should be stressed that this does not imply that African leaders can hold the colonial experience 
as an excuse to cover their failure to engage the process of development after 50 years of 
independence.  
Whatever the cause, post-colonial sub-Saharan African faces challenges in economic and social 
aspects. These challenges can be considered on one hand as internal constraints and on the other 
hand as external constraints. These internal and external constraints are interlinked. In the 
economic aspect, as part of internal constraints, these challenges include low levels of savings, 
episodic investment, and structural problems. And as part of external constraints, these 
challenges include terms of trade, aid, foreign direct investment, commodities prices and so on. 
In the social aspect, human development as indicated by social indicators in health and education 
remains a concern and continues to lag behind other regions. 
Chapter 4 has empirically assessed recent sub-Saharan African growth and human development. 
Firstly, the chapter conducted a descriptive analysis using graphs and tables for the different 
variables mentioned. Secondly a quantitative analysis was performed using panel data analysis. 
Although growth has resumed since 1994, there is no evidence that sub-Saharan Africa is 
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converging with other developing countries (which have also experience growth accelerations), 
or that sub-Saharan growth is driven by internal structural changes. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
experienced improvements in human development. However, the gap between it and other 
developing regions remains large. Although there is convergence in some indicators (such as life 
expectancy or infant mortality rate) this is not the case for many other indicators. In particular, 
indicators of economic structure (such as telephone infrastructure and manufacturing exports) 
do not show signs of convergence. Once again, the economic structural and economic 
infrastructure of sub-Saharan Africa has remained unchanged and negatively significant 
compared to other regions under the examination period. This demonstrates that sub-Saharan 
Africa’s recent growth remains a concern in terms of sustainability and to produce a genuine 
development.  
In summary, the study argues that economic growth without human development is not 
sustainable, particularly in the case of sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, it shows that there is a 
need for strong economic policies capable of sustaining capital accumulation through high 
domestic savings, high rates of investment, exports to achieve an ‘investment transition’ and to 
improve productivity growth. Besides that, the improvement of human development constitutes 
an important element for a qualitative and sustainable economic growth. The intention in this 
study was not to come up with an ideal solution or to be conclusive on how to achieve 
sustainability, but to lay a foundation for further research, to explore the dynamics on the 
question of sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: 
Gross domestic product growth annual % (constant 2000 US dollars) of some sub-
Saharan Africa countries 
Years 1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2011 
Countries        
Angola … 3.28 -3.78 6.43 10.07 12.59 3.4 
Botswana 10 11.86 4.06 7.44 5.28 3.01 5.05 
Burundi 5.35 3.72 -2.39 -1.34 2.20 4.49 4.19 
Burkina Faso 4.18 3.012 3.95 6.77 6.53 5.40 4.16 
Cameroon 9.40 -2.22 -1.86 4.74 3.71 2.96 3.8 
Chad 9.18 1.94 2.44 2.65 17.16 2.36 3.1 
D.R.Congo 1.86 0.005 -7.11 -3.88 4.31 5.60 6.87 
Congo 10.57 -0.26 0.5 2.48 4.1 5.26 4.45 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.32 1.17 1.50 3.21 0.0084 2.18 -4.7 
Gabon 2.55 1.72 3.13 0.40 1.74 2.85 4.81 
Ghana -0.25 4.80 4.284 4.31 5.04 6.65 14.39 
Kenya 2.52 5.64 1.60 2.16 3.65 4.60 4.5 
Lesotho 3.09 3.10 4.09 3.92 2.90 4.58 5.79 
Madagascar -1.54 2.74 -0.27 3.83 2.59 3.07 0.98 
Malawi 2.17 2.32 3.51 3.92 2.06 7.47 4.50 
Mali -2.24 3.86 2.98 5.18 6.39 4.98 2.7 
Mauritius 4.62 7.41 4.89 5.79 3.06 4.50 4.11 
Mozambique -4.62 5.61 3.58 7.52 8.83 … … 
Namibia -0.18 2.68 4.95 3.51 5.00 4.39 3.79 
Nigeria -2.75 5.42 2.49 3.07 6.18 6.69 6.67 
Rwanda 2.67 1.50 -3.95 10.22 7.68 7.44 8.6 
South Africa 1.40 1.67 0.88 2.79 3.83 3.22 3.12 
Sudan 0.83 4.55 5.13 6.45 5.36 7.34 -4.9 
Swaziland 5.39 13.47 3.06 2.85 2.10 2.47 1.3 
Uganda 0.69 5.09 7.04 6.05 6.70 8.21 6.7 
Zambia 0.53 1.63 -1.28 2.83 4.804 6.42 5.90 
Zimbabwe 4.35 4.59 1.39 2.40 -7.19 … … 
Source: Word Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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APPENDIX 2: 
Gross domestic product per capita PPP (current US dollars) of some sub-Saharan Africa 
countries 
Years 1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2011 
Countries        
Angola 750.563 836.774 579.330 561.200 1049.076 3792.627 5147.71 
Botswana 1014.727 1954.287 2835.686 3147.129 4412.334 6493.833 8680.31 
Burundi 228.772 213.642 173.169 140.435 127.292 200.937 271.245 
Burkina Faso 210.302 287.001 238.008 231.572 309.831 488.928 600.383 
Cameroon 770.897 1005.336 840.860 664.728 787.422 1139.367 1271.31 
Chad 183.574 242.374 240.048 203.751 346.499 694.841 823.022 
D.R.Congo 359.363 252.112 194.658 114.813 108.896 174.845 230.856 
Congo 1079.996 1017.009 891.094 832.096 1179.709 2575.248 3562.54 
Côte d’Ivoire 762.651 855.875 755.172 753.481 772.183 1118.900 1194.6 
Gabon 4773.717 4700.053 4816.007 4300.588 4762.051 8230.976 11113.9 
Ghana 352.725 387.466 384.458 372.678 372.407 1127.971 1570.13 
Kenya 347.764 369.036 297.051 436.882 447.006 741.155 808.001 
Lesotho 270.949 264.894 411.298 417.969 478.997 801.588 1105.91 
Madagascar 354.929 260.590 245.703 261.910 282.614 401.916 466.663 
Malawi 176.659 167.276 178.223 193.485 199.823 289.618 370.615 
Mali 175.260 237.514 261.982 238.098 328.215 551.970 668.575 
Mauritius 1091.529 1983.395 3082.642 3730.318 4507.898 6696.427 8797.05 
Mozambique 281.378 215.930 149.950 229.112 254.344 392.257 534.806 
Namibia 1602.550 1543.267 1910.606 1980.783 2543.195 4144.398 5292.89 
Nigeria 498.588 255.563 254.336 311.974 557.883 1172.400 1452.09 
Rwanda 264.522 334.853 257.828 257.513 221.494 444.854 582.787 
South Africa 2733.059 3167.202 3558.464 3311.475 3731.095 6004.264 8070.03 
Sudan 448.153 633.516 375.258 337.430 515.262 1260.534 1234.47 
Swaziland 776.265 874.963 375.258 1590.292 1858.048 3028.807 3725.28 
Uganda 183.269 319.471 194.163 273.009 264.912 439.200 487.105 
Zambia 513.295 398.854 392.854 347.746 441.531 1014.306 … 
Zimbabwe 894.389 766.306 642.107 606.944 482.951 420.243 … 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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APPENDIX 3: 
Some sub-Saharan Africa countries compared with other countries in terms of GDP per 
capita PPP (current US dollars) 
Years 1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2011 
Botswana 1014.73 1954.29 2835.69 3147.13 4412.33 6493.83 8680.31 
Brazil 1817.25 2453.94 3234.74 4484.11 3467.38 8200.79 12593.9 
Angola 750.563 836.774 579.330  561.200 1049.076 3792.627 5147.71 
Chile 1930.50 1925.65 3645.95 5141.30 5353.95 10662.13 14394.4 
Republic 
of Congo 
1079.996 1017.01 891.094 832.096 1179.71 2575.248 3562.54 
Malaysia 1999.62 2066.15 3415.05 4009.08 4508.62 7233.82 9656.25 
Nigeria 498.588 255.563 254.336 311.974 557.883 1172.4 2168.21 
Rwanda 264.522 334.853 257.828 257.513 221.494 444.854 582.787 
Republic 
of Korea 
2115.19 4425.44 8778.22 10369.58 13755.94 19558.61 22424.06 
South 
Africa 
2733.06 3167.2 3558.46 3311.48 3731.1 6004.26 8070.03 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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APPENDIX 4:  Sub-Saharan Africa region compared to other regions in terms of 
different variables 
Sub-Saharan Africa region compared with other regions in terms of GDP per capita PPP 
(current US dollars) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions in terms of fertility rate (total births per 
women) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 1980-
1985 
1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2011 
East Asia 
and 
Pacific 
1288.87 2265.97 3458.93 3747.32 4087.24 6108.07 8475.2 
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
2039.80 2164.66 3216.01 4098.67 4074.75 7272.75 9753.87 
OECD 
members 
8947.55 14314.50 19593.44 22025.80 26012.11 33827.31 37029 
Euro area 7933.14 14486.22 20727.78 21802.25 25989.75 37109.46 39267.8 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
571.12 575.17 552.94 537.47 646.66 1158.32 1445.45 
 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
East Asia 
and 
Pacific 
2.89 2.66 2.24 1.98 1.86 1.79 
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
3.87 3.38 2.99 2.71 2.49 2.28 
OECD 
members 
2.05 1.95 1.88 1.78 1.75 1.80 
Euro area 1.64 1.52 1.42 1.43 1.48 1.55 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
6.58 6.36 6.04 5.71 5.41 5.07 
South Asia 4.79 4.39 3.95 3.5 3.1 2.82 
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Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions in terms of mortality rate, under-5 (per 
1,000 live births) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions in terms of school enrolments, secondary 
(% gross) 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
East Asia 
and 
Pacific 
63.72 55.60 50.11 41.87 31.83 23.63 
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
71.02 57.65 47.29 37.56 29.05 22.73 
OECD 
members 
29.55 23.36 18.71 14.29 11.14 8.84 
Euro area 13.67 10.69 8.30 6.41 5.31 4.49 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
187.42 179.33 173.79 160.63 140.96 120.25 
South Asia 142.58 124.88 110.04 94.94 80.82 62.16 
 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
East Asia 
and 
Pacific 
39.54 42.95 50.88 61.39 67.97 77.26 
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
52.47 58.71 66.04 77.63 86.69 88.82 
OECD 
members 
83.39 85.85 90.28 94.25 97.64 98.01 
Euro area 87.24 91.99 100.95 103.8 104.7 106.6 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
21.19 22.67 23.09 24.48 29.01 35.91 
South Asia 30.3 33.97 40.53 42.95 46.78 54.31 
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APPENDIX 5: 
Industry value added (% of GDP) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Years 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
Countries       
Botswana 53.79 63.21 54.10 53.91 52.44 48.85 
Burundi 14.24 17.18 20.98 16.15 18.16 18.35 
Chad 13.29 15.48 13.26 12.94 32.06 54.56 
D.R.Congo 29.81 29.08 16.71 22.83 22.90 27.03 
Congo 53.65 35.39 39.43 57.63 65.54 74.52 
Côte d’Ivoire 20.13 22.25 21.51 23.21 23.51 25.99 
Gabon 60.42 43.40 47.63 51.44 54.34 59.72 
Kenya 19.51 18.94 17.64 17.46 17.90 19.15 
Lesotho 25.66 31.34 41.56 42.52 33.57 34.65 
Madagascar 13.46 13.46 11.28 13.28 15.21 16.14 
Malawi 21.24 25.43 24.77 18.37 17.66 16.36 
Mali 14.53 15.55 17.31 17.61 25.11 24.10 
Mauritius 26.32 32.80 32.71 31.16 29.75 27.51 
Mozambique 25.42 20.90 14.83 20.64 25.56 24.59 
Namibia 43.91 41.02 31.28 27.93 30.03 32.07 
Rwanda 22.50 20.01 19.02 17.66 13.66 14.39 
South Africa 44.28 41.59 36.02 32.25 31.80 31.45 
Sudan 15.61 15.19 11.67 16.51 23.17 30.68 
Swaziland 28.24 38.94 42.75 44.27 45.60 47.36 
Uganda 9.67 10.45 13.36 18.88 23.64 25.89 
Zambia 43.64 49.09 43.49 29.64 27.51 37.28 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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APPENDIX 6: 
 Agriculture value added (% of GDP) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Years 1980-1985 1985-
1990 
1990-1995 1995-
2000 
2000-2005 2005-2010 
Countries       
Botswana 9.79 5.63 4.76 3.30 2.11 2.25 
Burundi 59.41 55.48 51.07 48.47 44.27 37.42 
Chad 38.00 32.68 35.59 40.36 30.11 12.60 
D.R.Congo 31.03 30.54 51.36 46.37 50.90 42.81 
Congo 7.53 12.73 10.97 8.54 5.67 4.06 
Côte d’Ivoire 24.64 30.97 29.10 23.64 24.38 23.84 
Gabon 6.31 9.26 8.29 6.96 5.80 4.65 
Ghana 53.73 48.58 43.31 40.70 40.25 30.43 
Kenya 33.32 30.83 30.57 31.52 28.94 25.99 
Lesotho 24.23 25.19 18.83 17.19 10.47 7.98 
Madagascar 34.70 33.59 27.59 29.71 29.17 26.77 
Malawi 41.62 46.97 37.38 36.04 35.70 30.52 
Mauritius 15.52 14.26 10.85 8.38 6.47 4.33 
Mozambique 36.82 42.53 35.99 30.69 26.54 29.87 
Namibia 10.73 11.68 11.21 11.39 10.69 9.20 
Rwanda 40.27 37.46 38.57 43.55 37.35 34.52 
South Africa 5.31 5.29 4.19 3.75 3.37 2.99 
Sudan 34.25 38.06 39.56 44.76 38.17 27.55 
Swaziland 20.51 16.09 11.20 13.19 9.56 8.06 
Uganda 55.45 56.68 50.95 39.40 26.07 24.17 
Zambia 15.99 16.97 21.84 20.77 22.62 18.77 
Zimbabwe 16.52 15.99 14.38 19.98 17.21 18.89 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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APPENDIX 7: 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
Countries       
Botswana 58.69 65.65 49.70 52.83 46.33 40.55 
Burundi 10.18 10.33 10.24 7.56 6.47 6.52 
Cameroon 30.48 19.37 20.28 22.19 20.38 26.61 
Chad 13.60 14.22 14.88 17.95 32.79 50.07 
D.R.Congo 19.21 26.23 19.89 24.89 26.07 24.61 
Congo 57.92 44.87 51.07 74.63 80.88 78.67 
Côte d’Ivoire 40.12 33.42 34.73 40.54 47.46 45.96 
Gabon 61.58 41.29 52.63 60.003 58.97 61.64 
Ghana 6.46 17.60 20.83 35.85 40.85 26.68 
Kenya 27.02 23.65 32.36 22.09 25.40 26.62 
Lesotho 15.54 17.66 22.49 30.70 53.53 50.31 
Madagascar 11.76 16.01 19.19 23.80 25.80 28.86 
Malawi 24.29 22.84 24.52 26.11 24.89 27.78 
Mauritius 47.94 63.57 59.04 63.21 60.16 54.77 
Mozambique 6.27 6.72 13.16 14.007 28.44 31.40 
Namibia 59.41 57.51 51.03 46.22 42.16 47.08 
Nigeria 16.68 28.99 42.52 43.49 41.61 40.08 
Rwanda 11.27 7.68 5.90 6.80 9.51 11.78 
South Africa 27.28 28.17 22.08 25.63 28.94 30.36 
Sudan 8.87 4.68 4.49 8.51 15.34 18.73 
Swaziland 63.17 74.12 59.51 65.44 90.81 65.19 
Uganda 11.90 8.76 8.76 11.57 12.19 20.75 
Zambia 32.14 35.52 35.31 28.53 31.45 39.15 
Zimbabwe 19.11 23.60 30.93 38.53 33.44 38.85 
 93 
 
APPENDIX 8: 
Life expectancy at birth, total years of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Years 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
Countries       
Angola 40.53 41.02 41.55 43.78 47.32 49.83 
Botswana 61.94 63.83 61.70 53.97 49.73 52.42 
Burundi 47.77 47.28 44.93 45.35 47.03 48.99 
Burkina Faso 47.44 48.30 48.73 49.64 51.46 53.96 
Cameroon 52.26 53.21 52.61 50.81 49.51 50.23 
Chad 49.21 50.54 50.26 49.02 48.10 48.64 
D.R.Congo 46.18 46.66 46.42 45.49 46.50 47.58 
Congo 56.81 56.75 55.20 54.23 54.58 56.17 
Côte d’Ivoire 52.59 52.95 51.72 50.37 50.82 53.40 
Gabon 57.37 60.60 61.30 60.28 59.61 61.36 
Ghana 53.97 55.85 57.74 58.08 59.84 62.81 
Kenya 58.94 59.57 57.68 53.63 52.32 55.10 
Lesotho 55.26 58.06 58.71 51.36 44.76 45.95 
Madagascar 49.00 49.92 53.08 57.74 62.41 65.73 
Malawi 45.40 46.73 46.95 46.12 47.45 51.73 
Mali 41.13 43.42 45.08 46.63 48.22 50.12 
Mauritius 67.96 68.90 70.12 70.79 72.11 72.68 
Mozambique 42.74 42.85 44.41 46.65 47.68 48.93 
Namibia 59.07 60.43 60.69 58.81 57.65 60.85 
Nigeria 45.80 45.77 45.30 45.59 47.90 50.46 
Rwanda 49.59 40.64 28.40 40.75 50.32 54.11 
South Africa 58.74 61.062 60.86 56.96 52.20 51.37 
Sudan 50.33 51.86 53.57 55.79 58.64 60.48 
Swaziland 56.17 58.72 58.11 51.81 46.30 47.31 
Uganda 49.84 48.46 45.66 45.29 48.41 52.36 
Zambia 51.71 49.16 44.94 42.36 43.03 46.96 
Zimbabwe 60.65 61.29 56.55 47.63 43.47 47.17 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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APPENDIX 9: 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Years 1980-
1985 
1985-1990 1990-
1995 
1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
Countries       
Angola 7.20 7.18 7.09 6.91 6.51 5.74 
Botswana 5.86 5.04 4.25 3.63 3.15 2.85 
Burundi 6.52 6.49 6.41 6.01 5.33 4.60 
Burkina Faso 7.05 6.92 6.67 6.37 6.11 5.92 
Cameroon 6.36 6.07 5.61 5.11 4.88 4.62 
Chad 6.74 6.69 6.64 6.62 6.50 6.15 
D.R.Congo 6.74 7 7.12 7.01 6.63 6.02 
Congo 5.94 5.51 5.18 4.99 4.82 4.62 
Côte d’Ivoire 7.24 6.54 5.84 5.30 4.99 4.60 
Gabon 5.19 5.18 4.98 4.33 3.72 3.34 
Ghana 6.30 5.82 5.27 4.79 4.52 4.29 
Kenya 7.15 6.41 5.52 5.07 4.95 4.79 
Lesotho 5.43 5.08 4.68 4.29 3.76 3.33 
Madagascar 6.20 6.23 6.11 5.74 5.23 4.79 
Malawi 7.28 6.93 6.47 6.17 6.03 5.99 
Mali 7.07 7.08 7.00 6.87 6.68 6.42 
Mauritius 2.28 2.14 2.25 2.03 1.88 1.58 
Mozambique 6.43 6.30 6.09 5.81 5.47 5.07 
Namibia 6.13 5.49 4.84 4.24 3.76 3.36 
Nigeria 6.73 6.52 6.21 5.96 5.77 5.59 
Rwanda 8.23 7.55 6.36 5.90 5.59 5.41 
South Africa 4.49 3.92 3.30 2.94 2.75 2.53 
Sudan 6.31 6.05 5.78 5.47 5.06 4.57 
Swaziland 6.51 6.03 5.21 4.45 3.95 3.52 
Uganda 7.10 7.09 7.05 6.93 6.70 6.33 
Zambia 6.94 6.60 6.30 6.17 6.11 6.20 
Zimbabwe 6.61 5.58 4.68 4.03 3.70 3.42 
 Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
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APPENDIX 10: 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2011 
Angola 162.06 148.76 136.3 123.48 112.18 101.96 96.4 
Botswana 50.96 43.32 42.84 48.98 40 23.74 20.3 
Burundi 114.26 110.42 108.66 102.94 96.52 90.12 86.3 
Burkina Faso 111.9 105.98 102.72 97.26 90.78 84.7 81.6 
Cameroon 96.06 91.26 88.42 86.8 84.82 81.7 79.2 
Chad 119.6 114.92 110.66 106.64 102.88 99.32 97.1 
D.R.Congo 120.44 117.3 117.3 117.3 117.3 113.9 110.6 
Congo 79.18 76.12 73.26 70.38 67.82 65.28 63.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 111.58 105.66 101.58 96.9 91.1 84.64 81.2 
Gabon 77.34 70.76 65.6 61.64 57.8 52.6 49.3 
Ghana 92.14 81.42 71.86 66.32 60.32 54.86 51.8 
Kenya 64.74 61.32 69.06 71.46 63.64 53.62 48.3 
Lesotho 85.06 74.08 71.08 80.14 82.58 72.38 62.6 
Madagascar 106.7 102.16 88.88 72.56 58.96 47.96 42.8 
Malawi 143.7 137.36 125.78 107.56 86.22 64.16 52.9 
Mali 146.92 136 126.12 117.2 109.3 102.2 98.2 
Mauritius 27.14 22.3 19.46 18.02 14.26 13.24 12.8 
Mozambique 161.68 153.92 144.6 124.26 102.9 82.34 71.6 
Namibia 56.78 51.34 47.02 47.32 46.76 36.22 29.6 
Nigeria 125.52 126.02 126.38 118.18 102.14 86.44 78 
Rwanda 107.16 95.22 121.24 123.64 83.16 50.9 38.1 
South Africa 59.94 50.48 47.26 50.3 52.76 43.72 34.6 
Sudan 84 79.58 73.86 68.52 63.69 59.3 56.6 
Swaziland 74.4 63.31 62.24 72.36 81.16 75.56 69 
Uganda 114.52 109 102.08 91.58 77.36 64.94 57.9 
Zambia 102.38 111.74 111.28 97.72 82.42 64.48 52.7 
Zimbabwe 58.42 51.58 55.82 61.56 58.96 49.8 42.8 
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APPENDIX 11: 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live Births) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Years 1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2011 
Countries        
Angola 273.66 251.58 230.68 207.98 187.22 168.1 157.6 
Botswana 66.64 55.36 58.2 75.46 67.3 32.46 25.9 
Burundi 191.1 183.92 180.7 169.9 157.9 146.12 139.1 
Burkina Faso 226.58 211.36 202.88 188.58 171.28 154.9 146.4 
Cameroon 156.6 147.72 142.72 140.2 137.36 131.98 127.2 
Chad 223.6 212.46 202.16 192.44 183.22 174.5 169 
D.R.Congo 187.88 181.4 181.4 181.4 181.4 174.42 167.7 
Congo 126.24 153.6 148.36 110.44 105.88 101.34 98.8 
Côte d’Ivoire 162.46 153.6 148.36 141.74 132.54 121.3 114.9 
Gabon 107.98 97.84 90 84.26 79.14 71.18 65.6 
Ghana 149.8 130.28 113.14 103.22 92.6 82.94 77.6 
Kenya 100.22 94.12 108.04 114.92 101.8 82.94 72.8 
Lesotho 107.98 92.18 88.54 109.3 119.62 102.9 86 
Madagascar 177.12 168.46 143.86 114.36 90.2 70.78 61.6 
Malawi 242.82 232.72 213.6 180.6 142.72 103.64 82.6 
Mali 292.36 267.08 243.64 222.34 203.14 185.5 175.6 
Mauritius 32.92 26.02 22.2 20.28 16.58 15.48 15.1 
Mozambique 241.98 230.28 216.06 184.68 152.34 120.02 103.1 
Namibia 86.18 76.72 69.36 71.02 73.4 54.39 41.5 
Nigeria 211.68 212.6 213.26 198.34 168.44 139.42 124.1 
Rwanda 177.46 156.38 225.58 219.42 135.54 77.3 54.1 
South Africa 80.72 65.96 61.14 68.62 78.24 65.48 46.7 
Sudan 134.96 126.9 116.68 107.1 98.62 90.8 86 
Swaziland 103.4 86.2 85.38 104.6 124.04 117.74 103.6 
Uganda 191 182.46 171.24 151.7 125.04 102.34 89.9 
Zambia 168.18 187.1 188.98 165.76 138.04 105.86 82.9 
Zimbabwe 88.94 77.14 87.44 102.04 100.32 81.66 67.1 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 97 
 
APPENDIX 12: 
School enrolments, primary (% gross) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-
2000 
2000-2005 2005-2010 
Countries       
Botswana 94.28 102.23 103.87 103.18 106.42 108.54 
Burundi 36.93 63.75 70.75 54.97 77.01 135.62 
Burkina Faso 20.12 28.01 33.54 40.73 48.22 68.89 
Cameroon 94.59 97.77 87.42 82.11 106.08 114.59 
Congo 132.08 131.90 120.97 87.83 105.77 111.16 
Côte d’Ivoire 72.48 67.40 66.00 71.88 76.63 76.82 
Ghana 75.33 70.14 79.29 81.78 83.56 102.62 
Kenya 113.83 103.95 94.67 92.38 103.21 110.83 
Lesotho 104.60 109.24 106.51 103.97 112.31 105.27 
Madagascar 127.64 100.00 94.60 95.89 121.80 146.86 
Malawi 62.60 63.01 107.84 143.60 133.85 130.79 
Mali 24.45 23.93 31.79 48.80 65.51 77.46 
Mauritius 106.75 110.13 107.61 98.41 100.07 99.58 
Mozambique 88.68 67.68 61.46 69.23 90.01 111.41 
Nigeria 106.82 85.77 88.92 89.44 99.185 89.68 
Swaziland 94.67 93.37 94.50 93.63 97.47 111.34 
Uganda 62.92 71.17 67.23 114.24 132.54 122.11 
Zambia 97.45 98.63 92.63 84.34 99.16 118.70 
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APPENDIX 13: 
School enrolments, secondary (% gross) of some sub-Saharan Africa countries 
    Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
 
 
 
 
 
  1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-
2010 
Botswana 23.50 33.57 50.91 73.36 75.58 80.55 
Burundi 2.98 4.14 6.00 …  12.14 19.10 
Burkina Faso 2.91 5.34 7.10 9.42 11.39 17.35 
Cameroon 19.02 23.76 26.21 25.49 29.54 36.67 
Congo 68.43 61.36 48.72 42.01 41.29 …  
Côte d'Ivoire 18.59 18.04 …  23.27 25.96 …  
Ghana 38.85 37.04 35.33 40.35 42.69 54.52 
Kenya 32.15 40.31 …  38.82 44.58 55.39 
Lesotho 19.98 24.01 27.08 30.29 33.82 41.26 
Madagascar 34.73 19.60 …  …  21.77 28.14 
Malawi 16.87 16.60 18.48 32.28 30.17 30.74 
Mali 7.12 6.25 8.49 13.22 22.69 32.10 
Mauritius 46.20 50.28 56.41 72.98 78.60 88.30 
Mozambique 6.87 6.58 6.86 5.63 9.84 20.62 
Nigeria 23.84 25.40  … 23.77 31.31 36.73 
Swaziland 37.65 …  47.59 44.84 43.31 54.14 
Uganda 7.67 11.22 10.17 13.02 18.69 25.75 
Zambia 17.18 20.42 20.72 …  …  …  
South Africa …  62.73 71.75 89.01 87.77 …  
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APPENDIX 14: 
School enrolments, tertiary (% gross) of some sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: World Bank Database 2012 (World Development Indicators). 
  1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2011 
Botswana 1.49 2.31 4.90 5.45 6.99 7.44 7.44 
Burundi 0.52 0.63 0.77 1.01 1.94 2.71 2.71 
Burkina Faso 0.44 0.64 0.90 0.94 1.49 2.86 2.86 
Cameroon 1.72 2.42 3.08 4.61 5.07 8.59 8.59 
Congo 5.49 5.49 5.30 4.44 4.04 5.99 5.99 
Côte d'Ivoire 2.49 2.61 3.55 6.50 …  8.72 8.72 
Ghana 1.61 …  1.18 …  5.65 7.16 7.16 
Kenya 1.15 1.49  … 2.75 2.88 4.03 4.03 
Lesotho 1.10 1.48 2.21 2.22 2.64 3.52 3.52 
Madagascar 3.66 3.71 3.07 2.18 2.52 3.42 3.42 
Malawi 0.46 0.48 0.57 0.40 0.44 0.58 0.58 
Mali 0.91 0.74 0.80 1.50 2.24 5.39 5.39 
Mauritius 0.77 1.74 5.22 8.42 18.18 23.63 23.63 
Mozambique 0.10 0.20 0.41 0.59 1.19 …  …  
Nigeria 2.78 3.70 …  6.01 9.84 …  …  
Swaziland 4.05 4.00 4.14 5.16 4.71 4.43 4.43 
Uganda 0.67 0.98 1.45 2.11 3.35 3.80 3.80 
Zambia 1.50 2.11 …  2.37 …  …   … 
South Africa …  11.56 13.40  … …    …  
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APPENDIX 15: Selected indicators by regions 
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APPENDIX 16: Structural characteristic by regions 
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APPENDIX 17: Structural characteristic by countries 
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APPENDIX 18: 
List of countries used in the panel data estimation 
East Asia and 
Pacific (EAP) 
Latin America and 
Caribbean (developing 
only) (LAC) 
South Asia 
(SA) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) 
High income OECD 
(Dev) 
China 
Fiji 
Indonesia 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Thailand 
 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Uruguay 
 
Bangladesh 
India 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sénégal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Togo 
Zambia 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Iceland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
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APPENDIX 19: List of variables 
 
AG:    Agriculture sector 
EAP:    East Asia and Pacific 
EDU_PU:   Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) 
EXP:    Exports sector 
FERT:   Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 
GCF:    Gross Capital Formation 
GDP:    Gross Domestic Product Per capita (constant 2000 US$) and   
   Gross Domestic Product Per capita (current US$) 
GDS:    Gross Domestic Saving 
GF4:   Growth Forward 4 years 
GROW:   Annual growth rate of GDP 
                        GROWB4:   Four year ‘backward’ moving average of the growth rate of GDP per  
capita (in constant 2000 US$)  
HEALTH_PU:  Health expenditure, public (% of total health expenditure) 
HIOECD:   High Income OECD 
IMORT:  Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 
IMP:    Imports sector 
IND:    Industry sector 
INVEST:  Investment (Gross capital formation % GDP) 
LAC:    Latin America and Caribbean 
LIFEEX:  Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
MANEXP:   Manufactures exports (% merchandises exports) 
MANEXP/GDP:  Manufactures exports as a share of GDP 
MANU:   Manufacturing, value added (% GDP) 
PRENROL:   School enrolment, primary (% gross) 
ROADS:   Road, paved (% of total roads) 
SAVING:   Gross domestic saving (% GDP) 
SECENROL:   School enrolment, secondary (% gross) 
SERV:    Service sector 
SSA:    Sub-Saharan Africa 
SSA1:    takes value 1 if country is in sub-Saharan Africa, 0 otherwise sample is  
restricted to LAC, EAP and DEV 
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TELE:   Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
TERTENROL:  School enrolment, tertiary (% gross) 
_80_94R:   takes value 1 if year is 1980-1994, 0 if otherwise. Sample is restricted to  
1960-1979 
_05_11R:   takes value 1 if year is 2005-2011, 0 if otherwise. Sample is restricted to  
1995-2004 
_95_11:   takes value 1 if year is 1995-2011, 0 if otherwise  
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APPENDIX 20: Regressions output 
 Dependent variable: FERT (Fertility rate, total births per woman) 
Source: Author’s estimation. T-Statistics are given in parentheses.*Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, 
***Significant at 10%. 
 
 Dependent variable: SECENROL (School enrolment, Secondary %gross) 
Source: Author’s estimation. T-Statistics are given in parentheses.*Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, 
***Significant at 10%. 
 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C 10.33645 (52.34791)* 
8.328892 
(25.92315)* 
9.214479 
(48.31006)* 
9.772883 
(60.61113)* 
SSA1 0.674519 (11.51278)* 
1.630050 
(15.61322)* 
0.993551 
(13.66047)* 
0.773076 
(14.65381)* 
Log(GDP) -0.826536 (-31.50174)* 
-0.654658 
(-15.18751)* 
-0.806356 
(-33.42579)* 
-0.676746 
(-31.03158)* 
Ed_pu  -0.058821 (-2.958124)* 
  
_05_11r   -0.261868 (-4.130276)* 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   -0.133183 (-1.518385) 
 
_95_11    -1.690146 (-29.30580)* 
SSA1*_95_11    0.379914 (4.799621)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 2768 880 909 2768 
Adjusted R-squared 0.488265 0.664963 0.816587 0.662051 
S.E. of regression 1.192907 1.047841 0.659178 0.969414 
Sum squared resid 3934.670 961.8216 392.8016 2596.567 
F-statistic 1321.047 582.5313 1011.642 1356.159 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.972793 0.899997 1.654779 1.277010 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C -72.21607 (-19.34698)* 
-61.33913 
(-11.45058)* 
-69.33177 
(-14.19548)* 
-66.83315 
(-20.44836)* 
SSA1 -4.350199 (-3.846844)* 
-11.75086 
(-6.491797)* 
-5.969775 
(-3.252631)* 
-4.134640 
(-3.704056)* 
Log(GDP) 16.91539 (34.75151)* 
15.59486 
(21.46697)* 
17.69225 
(28.85432)* 
15.13716 
(34.87558)* 
Edu_pu  1.664154 (4.764510)* 
  
_05_11r   7.124619 (4.653703)* 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   -0.297918 (-0.132703) 
 
_95_11    21.03803 (18.84209)* 
SSA1*_95_11    -6.359317 (-3.974388)* 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 1649 729 612 1649 
Adjusted R-squared 0.583313 0.651351 0.764259 0.682339 
S.E. of regression 17.80927 17.16794 13.79076 15.54973 
Sum squared resid 522061.9 213685.3 115442.3 397509.7 
F-statistic 1154.501 454.3534 496.2063 885.9792 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.419484 1.100947 1.722178 1.662297 
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Dependent variable: ROADS (Road, paved % of total roads) 
Source: Author’s estimation. T-Statistics are given in parentheses.*Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, 
***Significant at 10%. 
 
Dependent variable: SAVING (Gross domestic saving) 
Source: Author’s estimation. T-Statistics are given in parentheses.*Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, 
***Significant at 10%. 
 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C -40.76255 (-5.846829)* 
-43.80460 
(-6.231331)* 
-46.40894 
(-5.228125)* 
-41.17719 
(-5.832353)* 
SSA1 2.097021 (0.966350) 
1.842885 
(0.867194) 
2.462017 
(0.801915) 
1.786439 
(0.573500) 
Log(GDP) 9.464407 (10.62205)* 
8.184379 
(8.842266)* 
10.27651 
(9.081401)* 
9.399698 
(10.48839)* 
Invest  0.551275 (6.375578)* 
  
_05_11r   -1.183253 (-0.358231) 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   5.100157 (1.016721) 
 
_95_11    1.325363 (0.542322) 
SSA1*_95_11    0.504218 (0.143226) 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 58 564 379 578 
Adjusted R-squared 0.225443 0.266920 0.240021 0.223837 
S.E. of regression 19.98766 19.53261 20.63109 20.00837 
Sum squared resid 229716.4 213652.7 159190.0 229392.0 
F-statistic 84.97109 69.33099 30.84549 42.60023 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.571928 1.659304 1.505792 1.576504 
variable 1 2 3 4 
C -5.750652 (-2.583467)* 
-10.80738 
(-6.147267)* 
2.303192 
(0.692879) 
-5.768676 
(-2.591838)* 
SSA1 0.408575 (0.626105) 
0.426735 
(0.830087) 
-2.679315 
(-2.222600)** 
0.786209 
(1.013303) 
Log(GDP) 3.335338 (11.55236)* 
1.595304 
(6.830544)* 
2.321963 
(5.501536)* 
3.267810 
(11.19612)* 
Invest  0.796559 (32.27353)* 
  
_05_11r   0.934375 (0.908540) 
 
SSA1*_05_11r   2.389684 (1.541681) 
 
_95_11    1.121743 (1.562095) 
SSA1*_95_11    -0.975204 (-0.936243) 
Total panel (unbalanced observations) 1745 1733 775 1745 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102699 0.439178 0.098891 0.102945 
S.E. of regression 10.71770 8.423619 10.62264 10.71623 
Sum squared resid 200101.9 122685.3 86887.17 199817.4 
F-statistic 100.8030 453.1078 22.23546 51.03462 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.729078 1.787212 1.763215 1.731804 
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